Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications
2011

Ambivalence & Activism: Employment Discrimination in China
Timothy Webster

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Comparative and Foreign Law
Commons

Repository Citation
Webster, Timothy, "Ambivalence & Activism: Employment Discrimination in China" (2011). Faculty
Publications. 105.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/105

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Ambivalence
Employment
China

and
Activism:
Discrimination in
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ABSTRACT

Chinese courts have not vigorously enforced many human
rights, but a recent string of employment discrimination
lawsuits suggests that, given the appropriate conditions,
advocacy strategies, and rights at issue, victims can vindicate
constitutional and statutory rights to equality in court.
Specifically, carriers of the hepatitis B virus (HBV) have used
the 2007 Employment Promotion Law to ground legal
challenges against employers who discriminate against them in
the hiring process. Plaintiffs’ relatively high success rate
suggests official support for making one prevalent form of
discrimination illegal. Central to these lawsuits is a broad
network of lawyers, activists, and scholars who actively support
plaintiffs, suggesting a limited role for civil society in the world
of Chinese law.
Although many problems remain with
employment discrimination, China has made concrete steps
toward repealing a legal edifice of discrimination that stretches
back decades and reshaping policies and attitudes to eradicate a
prevalent form of discrimination, targeting carriers of infectious
disease.

* Lecturer-in-Law & Senior Research Scholar, Yale Law School; Senior Fellow,
The China Law Center. I thank Debbie Davis, Cindy Estlund, Paul Gewirtz, Li Cheng,
Lu Jun, Annelise Riles, Randy Peerenboom, Sida Liu, and Yan Tian for informative
comments and discussions at various stages. I also appreciate feedback from audiences
at the Social Science Workshop on China at Yale, Clarke Colloquium Series at Cornell
Law School, the Law and Society’s Association Early Career Workshop, and the
Overseas Young Chinese Forum at the University of Chicago. I dedicate this piece to
Lu Jun, and the indomitable courage and broad vision he has brought to the protection
of disadvantaged people throughout China.
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In 2003, two young college graduates almost got jobs in China’s
elite civil service.1 Zhou Yichao, handsome and twenty-three years
old, scored well on both the written test and the oral interview,
ranking eighth of the 157 applicants. Zhang Xianzhu, twenty-five
years old and bespectacled, ranked first among the thirty applicants
in his hometown. Both men then took medical examinations, the
final phase of the Chinese hiring process.
Their medical
examinations revealed that both men carried the hepatitis B virus
(HBV), and according to provincial regulations on civil service

1.
The Los Angeles Times and New York Times both covered these men’s
sagas. See Joseph Khan, Chinese People’s Republic Is Unfair to Its Short People, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2004, at A13 (describing the case of Zhang Xianzhu); Ching-Ching Ni,
Killer Inspires Drive Against Hepatitis Bias, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at A5 (describing
the cases of Zhou Yichao and Zhang Xianzhu).
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examinations, this rendered them ineligible for government posts.
Both were surprised by this result.
Zhou
Yichao
first
contemplated
suicide,
but
upon
reconsideration, he bought a paring knife, went to the government
office to ask about the results, and then stabbed two civil servants,
killing one. Zhang Xianzhu also took an unexpected course of action.
He retained a prominent discrimination lawyer and sued the
government agency for violating his constitutional rights. Around
these two cases—the murder trial of Zhou Yichao and the
administrative litigation initiated by Zhang Xianzhu—a legal
movement coalesced. China’s HBV community, which at that point
consisted of a couple of online chat rooms and discussion boards,
seized upon these cases to launch a multifaceted campaign to
introduce
antidiscrimination
laws,
eliminate
employment
discrimination, and change social attitudes more generally.
Somewhat remarkably, HBV advocates have largely succeeded in the
first mission, lobbying government bodies to institute legal
protections. However, like discriminatory attitudes more generally,
discrimination by employers remains deeply rooted in contemporary
China.
Since these events unfolded in 2003, advocates have petitioned
government bodies, conducted campaigns to increase public
understanding of the actual health risks of HBV, and litigated dozens
of discrimination lawsuits. The government’s response has been
impressive.
In at least three national laws (falü) and six
administrative regulations (guize), Chinese government bodies have
addressed the employment rights of disadvantaged Chinese,
including women, ethnic minorities, the disabled, and carriers of
infectious diseases (like HBV and AIDS).
Central to the
government’s various legislative responses has been the careful
mobilization of the HBV community, which has drafted
recommendations and petitions to government agencies, sent open
letters to Chinese government leaders, and commented on draft
legislation prepared by the national legislature. This campaign
opened a discussion about the nature of discrimination in China, as
well as the role that citizens play in eradicating it.
Discrimination is a prevalent but poorly understood social
problem in China. The shift from a state-controlled to a marketbased economy in the past thirty years has impacted virtually every
aspect of Chinese society, from raging economic growth to a floating
population larger than most countries. But it has also opened up new
opportunities for people to assert their free will, whether by
purchasing new products, enjoying new forms of leisure, or engaging
in new occupations. It has also given employers, once bound by the
diktat of centralized economic planning, considerable autonomy to
hire, as well as to discriminate in that process.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670175

646

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

[Vol. 44:643

Of course, discriminatory practices and attitudes do not
materialize out of thin air. One of this Article’s primary arguments is
that the Chinese government—at all levels—plays a leading role in
promoting discrimination.2 By mandating an earlier retirement age
for women, as it has done since the early 1950s, the Chinese
government signals to society that women are frail, merit special
treatment, and cannot work as hard or as long as men. Likewise, the
household registration system (hukou) stamps a person as either
rural or urban and links his access to social benefits to the locality
where he is registered. Given the enormous gap between rich cities
and poor villages, as well as the difficulty of changing one’s hukou
status, Chinese villagers face dim job prospects and a thicket of
municipal restrictions on hiring out-of-towners. Official barriers also
remain intact against carriers of infectious diseases. As seen above,
civil service positions require applicants to be free of infectious
diseases, even when the job itself presents no risk of contagion.
Facing these policies and social attitudes that reflect distrust
and disfavor, advocates of various stripes—nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), public interest lawyers, concerned citizens,
government-operated nongovernmental organizations (GONGOs),
and others—have mobilized to challenge discrimination. In close
contact with the media and online channels, these advocates have
raised awareness, lobbied legislative and administrative bodies to
repeal discriminatory regulations and pass protective ones, and filed
dozens of lawsuits claiming employment discrimination. This Article
argues that these mobilization efforts, as well as the legislative and
administrative responses by government bodies, indicate a newfound
responsiveness of the Chinese government to equal employment, a
core issue of human rights. More importantly, the fact that courts
have routinely found for victims of discrimination suggests that the
level of commitment is more than merely “discursive,” or paper on the
books. Although we can, and will, rightly question the efficacy of
remedies ordered by Chinese courts, it is clear that officials across
various sectors of the Chinese government agree that discrimination
against HBV carriers, if no one else, is worth proscribing.

2.
The Chinese government is by no means unique in this regard. Over the
years, the United States federal government and state governments have promulgated
numerous facially discriminatory laws, from the Chinese Exclusion Act, Pub. L. No. 71,
22 Stat. 58 (1882) and the Asian Exclusion Act, 43 Stat. 153 (1924), to the Jim Crow
laws passed in many Southern states. Most recently, a new Arizona law requires law
enforcement officials to determine the immigration status of any person “where
reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the
United States.” Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, 2010 Ariz.
Sess. Laws 113, 113. In July 2010, a federal judge blocked this provision of the law, and
several others, from going into effect. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980,
987 (D. Ariz. 2010).
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This Article proceeds in five parts.
Because the field of
employment discrimination is so vast, this Article narrows the scope
by focusing on three large disadvantaged groups: women, migrant
workers, and carriers of infectious diseases. Discrimination itself is a
multifaceted phenomenon. Therefore, in analyzing the current status
of discrimination in China and the laws that prohibit it, this Article
adopts several methodologies, including interviews with lawyers and
activists involved in discrimination issues, analysis of verdicts
brought by victims of discrimination, sociological materials on social
movements, and conventional methods for the excavation and
interpretation of current (and annulled) Chinese law and regulation.
An interdisciplinary approach permits reflection both on the nature of
existing Chinese law and on the processes and people that have led to
its reformulation and revision.
Part I briefly describes the historical context for the discussion
and reviews competing concepts of employment discrimination as
developed in the West.
Part II describes the most common—and perhaps the most
serious—manifestations
of
employment
discrimination
in
contemporary China.
These manifestations can be overt: job
advertisements openly express preferences or limitations based on
gender, health status, age, height, household registration, and so on.
The prevalence of discriminatory preferences in job advertisements
reflects both the popularity of discriminatory attitudes and the
impunity employers enjoy in screening candidates in this manner.
Alternatively, more covert forms of discrimination are practiced in
the selection process itself. Employers deploy a wide range of
techniques to exclude women, hepatitis B carriers, and other
disfavored groups (women under 5’2” or over thirty years old; men
under 5’5” or over thirty-five years old). Medical examinations,
photographs, CVs, written examinations, and other “objective” forms
of documentation provide employers with the pretextual grist needed
to weed out undesirable applicants. During the interview itself,
employers may ask female candidates about their marital status and
future plans for children. These processes produce distinctively
discriminatory workspaces, which are reproduced and normalized in
factories, stores, and offices.
Part III outlines the law of employment discrimination prior to
the Employment Promotion Law.3 It attends to laws that both
promote and proscribe discrimination, highlighting the essentially
ambivalent role that the Chinese government has played in this
regard. On the one hand, China has instituted a number of
discriminatory laws and practices in its sixty-year history. Women,

3.
Jiuye Cujin Fa [Employment Promotion Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008).
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for instance, must retire before men,4 a form of paternalism perhaps
plausible in the 1950s, when the regulation was first passed, but no
longer apposite.5 Likewise, State Council regulations issued in the
1980s—and still in effect—foreclose job opportunities to infectious
diseases carriers due to concerns about contagion.6 These restrictions
sweep broadly and do not accurately reflect the medical risk that
potential workers may pose to their colleagues and customers. On
the other hand, national legislation—such as the Labor Law7 and the
Women’s Law8—has prohibited discrimination against various
disadvantaged groups since the early 1990s. But they have provided
little legal protection and few remedial opportunities or mechanisms.
More recent regulations have further sought to entrench the rights of
migrant workers, with varying degrees of success.
Part IV explains how advocates for HBV carriers have effected
legal change in the area of employment discrimination. Using
sociological and political theory, this Part describes how a social
movement coalesced around the issue of HBV discrimination.
Spurred by the cases of Zhou Yichao and Zhang Xianzhu, HBV
advocates have activated a wide range of civil society actors—
carriers, public interest lawyers, concerned citizens, online discussion
boards, and NGOs—to champion the rights of HBV carriers. Using
media pressure and online tools to mobilize public opinion, HBV
advocates adopted a multipronged strategy to challenge many forms
of discrimination, including employment discrimination. By litigating
cases and encouraging thwarted jobseekers to come forward and sue,
they frame the struggle as one with deeply human consequences.
Judges are often sympathetic to the discrimination claims of HBV
carriers because employment rights are the core socioeconomic rights
that China claims to privilege. Activists also petition Chinese
government bodies to suggest ways to resolve problems with existing
law, and they point out areas that law should cover. These various
strategies have convinced several government agencies to issue
regulations to protect the rights of roughly 120 million carriers.
Part V examines the 2007 Employment Promotion Law and its
progeny of lawsuits. The law expands existing legal protections, but
it also offers victims of employment discrimination a new tool with
which to challenge discrimination: access to courts. By suing,
affected jobseekers can vindicate labor rights that existed almost

4.
See infra notes 115–25 and accompanying text.
5.
See infra notes 115, 117, 125.
6.
See infra notes 213–18 and accompanying text.
7.
Laodong Fa [Labor Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/
englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383754.htm.
8.
Funü Quanyi Baozhang Fa [Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and
Interests] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 3, 1992,
effective Oct. 1, 1992).
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exclusively as theory or principle for the past two decades. It is too
early to decide whether litigation will meaningfully alter the
practices and attitudes of Chinese employers, but the threat of losing
a lawsuit may deter some from discriminating against applicants.
Still, a great deal of work must be done to advance this key human
right. Accordingly, the end of this Part offers ways to make the law
more effective.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Background
Throughout its short history, the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) has always had antidiscrimination law.
The 1954
Constitution, in a nod to the recently annexed Tibet and Xinjiang,
guaranteed the right to equality for all ethnic groups: “The People’s
Republic of China is a unified multiethnic nation. All ethnicities
shall be equal. It is prohibited to discriminate against or oppress any
ethnicity . . . .”9
This is the sole appearance of the word
“discriminate” in the 1954 Constitution,10 and one of two in the
current Constitution,11 but it was not the only provision to address
discrimination. Its close correlate, “equality,” also appeared—as it
has in all four of China’s constitutions—to guarantee equality
between men and women in the social, political, cultural, and
educational fields.12 Gender equality has long been a central concern
for the Chinese government, but it remains an elusive goal to achieve.
During the early years of the PRC, women gained traction in the
fields of culture, education, and employment, but made less progress
in social rights, and remained largely invisible in the political sphere
(as they do today).13 In other words, a wide gulf separates the

9.
XIANFA art. 3 (1954) (emphasis added).
10.
The 1982 Constitution prohibits discriminating between religious believers
and non-believers. XIANFA art. 36 (1982).
11.
Id. art. 4 (“Discrimination against and oppression of any nationality are
prohibited.”); id. art. 36 (prohibiting discriminating “against citizens who believe in, or
do not believe in, any religion”). Both provisions remain aspirational.
12.
See XIANFA art. 48 (1982) (“The state protects women’s rights and interests,
implements equal pay for equal work between men and women, and cultivates and
promotes female cadres.”); XIANFA art. 53 (1978) (specifying further the principle of
equal pay for equal work (tonggong tongchou)); XIANFA art. 27 (1975) (providing that
women and men enjoy equal rights in all aspects); XIANFA art. 96 (1954) (providing that
men and women enjoy equal rights in politics, economics, culture, society, family life,
and all other aspects).
13.
See Women a Rare Sight in China’s Corridors of Power, ABC NEWS (Oct. 22,
2007), http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/10/22/2065608.htm.
No woman has ever served on the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee,
and Ms. Wu [Yi] was the only woman on the outgoing 24-member Politburo,
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aspirations of equality enshrined in the Chinese Constitution from
the promotion of equality and proscription of discrimination in
everyday life.
Moreover, because individuals cannot assert
constitutional rights,14 the Constitution, without some kind of
implementing legislation, continues to inspire but not safeguard basic
rights.
In the early days of the PRC, the Chinese government made
concerted efforts to increase the role and visibility of women in the
workplace.
The central government issued administrative
regulations to staff women in fields traditionally dominated by men,
such as the commercial and service sectors.15 Women were also
encouraged to enter professions formerly monopolized by men, such
as tractor drivers, railroad engineers, and pilots.16 In this period,
women worked in “every sector of the national economy, every
industry, and every profession, revealing a huge potential labor force
that had never been recognized or understood by the society or by
women themselves.”17
Under the planned economy, government personnel offices made
most employment decisions, which filled quotas in line with national
economic policy.18 If an employee possessed little education, she
usually was assigned to the same work unit as her parent.19 A more
educated employee could take an examination for entry into more
specialized positions like teacher, scientist, or engineer.20
At the same time, China also put in place restrictions that,
however well-intentioned, laid the foundation for today’s
discriminatory edifices, practices, and attitudes. The differential
retirement age for men and women is the leading example of these
unintended consequences. Aimed at shortening the time a woman
had to work in acknowledgement of her role in delivering and rearing

ranked one notch below the Standing Committee. Before her, just three women
had been full Politburo members, and all were wives of top leaders, including
Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing . . . .
Id.
14.
ZHOU WEI, XIANFA JIBEN QUANLI SIFA JIUJI YANJIU [STUDIES ON JUDICIAL
REMEDIES FOR BASIC RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION] 118–19 (2003). Instead, lawyers
must rely on statutes that implement constitutional protections in order to file cases in
People’s Courts. Id. at 119.
15.
Jiang Yongping, Employment and Chinese Urban Women Under Two
Systems, in HOLDING UP HALF THE SKY: CHINESE WOMEN PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE
207, 210 (Tao Jie et al. eds., 2004).
16.
Id.
17.
Id. at 210–11.
18.
Yong-Qing Fang et al., National Policy Influence on Women’s Careers in the
People’s Republic of China, in EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN IN CHINESE CULTURES: HALF
THE SKY 49, 51 (Cherlyn Skromme Granrose, ed., 2005) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT OF
WOMEN].
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
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children, the policy, when initially promulgated in 1957, was seen as
a boon to women.21 Fifty years later, the policy has come to signify
something different: that women are somehow less capable or
suitable than men for both labor and cadre positions. As a result,
many women are let go, often forcibly, five to ten years before their
male counterparts, even if they want to keep working.22
Likewise, when instituted in 1958, the household registration
system (hukou) restricted the movement of all Chinese citizens,
keeping urban residents in cities and rural residents in the
Since that time, the Chinese government has
countryside.23
systematically privileged the development of urban areas over rural
ones. Better funded education, transportation, health care, social
benefits, and other services have made China’s cities much more
However, because the government
attractive places to live.24
restricted travel, and made changing one’s hukou status very
difficult, rural residents were condemned to a lifetime of poverty,25
enjoying none of the “access to economic and social opportunities,
activities and benefits” that their urban compatriots enjoyed.26 At
present, urban residents tend to view rural residents (many of whom
migrated to the cities for low-end jobs) with a mixture of contempt
and hostility, while city governments have issued a raft of ordinances
that privilege local (urban) residents over outside (rural) residents in
employment, education, and social services.27
With the move away from central planning and the opening up of
the market economy in the 1980s and 1990s, the problem of
discrimination crept into employment decisions. No longer firmly
fixed to their work units, Chinese citizens had greater mobility to
pursue a broader range of employment opportunities. Employers, no
longer bound by centralized hiring decisions, could select whom to
employ with little outside input. In this newly emergent space, a host
of traditional attitudes about women, outsiders, illness, and disability
resurged. Stereotyped thinking still retains currency in the minds of

21.
Ding Hua, Laodong Falü/Zhengce Zhidingzhongde Shehui Xingbie
Pingdeng Huigu Yanjiu [Review of Gender Equality in Labor Law and Policymaking],
in XINGBIE PINGDENGDE FALÜ YU ZHENGCE: GUOJI SHIYE YU BENTU SHIJIAN [LAWS &
POLICIES TOWARDS GENDER EQUALITY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND LOCAL
IMPLEMENTATION] 167, 187 (Tan Lin & Du Jie eds., 2008).
22.
See infra Part III.B.
23.
FEI-LING WANG, ORGANIZING THROUGH DIVISION & EXCLUSION: CHINA’S
HUKOU SYSTEM 24 (2005).
24.
See CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, CHINA’S HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION
SYSTEM: SUSTAINED REFORM NEEDED TO PROTECT CHINA’S RURAL MIGRANTS 2–3
(2005), http://www.cecc.gov/pages/news/hukou.pdf?PHPSESSID=d7ba37aeb55f864e3c6
2880ef899d59a (describing how the Chinese government gave benefits to nonagricultural workers and encouraged movement to urban areas to combat the rural
labor surplus).
25.
See infra Part III.B.
26.
FEI-LING WANG, supra note 23, at 24.
27.
See infra notes 165–71 and accompanying text.
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many Chinese and finds analogues across a wide variety of
government policies and legislation.
B. Defining Discrimination
Before examining the legal edifices that promote and proscribe
employment discrimination, some discussion of discrimination itself
is needed. Employment discrimination is a complicated phenomenon,
involving conscious decisions and unconscious assumptions about
people due to qualities supposedly possessed by virtue of their sex,
race, national origin, or other immutable characteristics.
In the United States, federal courts distinguish direct
discrimination, also known as disparate treatment, from indirect
discrimination, or disparate impact. Direct discrimination—“the
most easily understood type of discrimination”28—occurs when an
employer treats a person less favorably than someone else due to a
protected trait, such as his or her gender, age, or race.29 Indirect
discrimination is somewhat harder to grasp, as it involves a facially
neutral practice or policy with “a disproportionately adverse effect on
minorities.”30 Chinese scholars are fond of citing an 1870 ordinance
from the San Francisco City Council banning the use of shoulder
poles (or danbao).31 Although facially neutral, the ordinance clearly
targeted Chinese immigrants, who retained the use of the pole to
transport objects in their adoptive homeland.32
Finally, systemic discrimination refers to policies or practices
that have a disproportionately broad impact on a larger
subpopulation (racial, geographical, professional, or otherwise).33
This Article argues that the hukou system constitutes the most
pernicious form of systemic discrimination in contemporary China.
Systemic discrimination, though developed in the United States and
other Western societies, is relevant to the structural elements of
discrimination in the PRC: lopsided development, inequality of
educational opportunity, and uneven access to social services. In
other words, the manifestations and structural causes of
discrimination travel quite well.

28.
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
29.
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009) (citing Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988)).
30.
Id.
31.
See, e.g., ZHONGGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO JIUYE CUJIN FA JIEDU [AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA] 70 (Xin Chunying ed., 2007) [hereinafter PROMOTION LAW INTERPRETATION].
32.
Id.
33.
See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE
REPORT TO THE CHAIR OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1 (2006)
(defining systemic cases as those which have “‘a broad impact on an industry,
profession, company, or geographic location’”).

2011]

Employment Discrimination in China

653

The preceding definitions are particularly important because
Chinese statutory law, like U.S. statutory law,34 does not define
discrimination, even as many laws proscribe it. The lack of a formal
definition has not hobbled the judicial development of
antidiscrimination law in the United States, where courts routinely
step in to fill gaps in legislation by defining discrimination, creating
judicial mechanisms such as burdens of proof by which to capture
discriminatory conduct, or prescribing remedies.35 But Chinese
courts play a far less active role in defining and creating law and
legal mechanisms.36 Instead, Chinese courts play a more active role
in the enforcement of existing laws than the creation or critique of
law and policy.37
II. CHINESE DISCRIMINATION
Chinese scholars identify many types of discrimination in China.
One Chinese scholar identified over a dozen forms of discrimination
in employment alone.38 Some of these forms, such as age and
disability, are similar to recognized forms of discrimination in U.S.
Others would not properly be considered
federal law.39
discrimination in the United States, but rather proxies of an
employee’s abilities, such as academic background, CV, and work
experience.40 Still others reflect China’s unique socio-political biases,

34.
See Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“Title VII does not define ‘discrimination’ . . . . Lack of a definition leaves unresolved
the question how important a difference must be to count as ‘discrimination.’”).
35.
See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE 164–66 (2d ed. 2004) (describing the variety of
ways in which appellate courts have defined discrimination).
36.
See Benjamin L. Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 21 Colum. J.
Asian L. 1, 32 (2007) (noting the “modest reach of judicial innovation in China”).
37.
Of course, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) can issue judicial
interpretations (sifa jieshi) of a particular law, which offer guidance to judges applying
the law. See, e.g., Introduction to China’s Legal System, Law Library of Cong.,
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/china.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2011). But the SPC has
issued no such document regarding employment discrimination.
38.
Lou Yaoxiong, Woguo “Jiuye Qishi” de Fali Fenxi ji Duice [Analysis and
Countermeasures for the Law of “Employment Discrimination” in China], Beijing
Youdian Daxue Xuebao (Shehui Kexueban) [J. Beijing U. Posts & Telecomms. (Soc. Sci.
Ed.)], no. 3, 2004, at 63, 64.
39.
Congress made age discrimination illegal by the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90–202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006)). Disability discrimination was banned by the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111–12213, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 225, 611 (West 2011)).
40.
Federal law protects against discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, age, disability, and genetic information. The framework has been
gradually built up over four decades, from the 1964 Civil Rights Act to the 2008
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. See generally U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FEDERAL LAWS PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION QUESTIONS AND
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such as region (e.g., antipathy for people from Henan province),
household registry, and membership in the communist party.41
Other forms of discrimination reflect concerns about the human body,
such as height and appearance, or concern over the spread of
disease.42 To this list one must add categories already protected in
Chinese national legislation, such as sex, religious belief, race, and
ethnicity.43
Despite this profusion of categories, certain classifications are
more pernicious than others. Discrimination based on a person’s
academic background, CV, and work experience may usefully identify
talent, giving employers a shortcut to wade through the large number
of job applicants in China’s crowded job market. Yet other forms of
discrimination—such as sex, health status, and household
registration—serve only to disqualify persons based on outmoded
thinking and irrational presumptions about the capacity to work
productively.
This Part examines three types of empirical evidence of
employment discrimination: job advertisements, statistical surveys,
and personal narratives. Job advertisements, both in print and
online, help depict the culture of job recruitment. Since these ads are
often the first link in the chain of the hiring process, they are
particularly valuable indicia of what is permissible and expected of
applicants.
Advertisements also reveal the expectations and
preferences that employers bring to bear on their personnel decisions.
Similarly, statistical surveys about attitudes and experiences of
discrimination provide an empirical basis to understand which forms
of discrimination are most widespread. Different studies arrive at
divergent conclusions about which forms of discrimination are most
prevalent, but such divergence may be inevitable whenever
perceptions, personal experiences, and other subjective forms of
knowledge are analyzed. Finally, personal narratives shed additional
light on the experience of discrimination from the applicant’s
perspective, while illuminating the techniques used to weed out
candidates. Interview questions, e-mail exchanges, requests for
photographs, and other devices to smoke out “undesirable” job
candidates may not be captured by statistics or other sources, but
these techniques are critical to understanding the mechanics of
employment discrimination in China.

ANSWERS, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html (last updated Nov. 21, 2009) (listing
discrimination laws). Presently, Congress is considering extending the same
protections to sexual orientation. See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act,
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplace/enda.asp (last updated
Apr. 8, 2011) (describing the content and current status of the bill).
41.
Lou Yaoxiong, supra note 38, at 64.
42.
Id.
43.
Laodong Fa [Labor Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) art. 12.
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A. Job Advertisements
In the United States and the United Kingdom, critical
assessment of job advertisements has provided important insights
into the discriminatory preferences of employers. In the United
States, for instance, gender and age discrimination surfaced in
advertisements throughout the 1980s, even though federal law had
banned such preferences since the 1960s.44
In one survey,
researchers found 9.5 percent of advertisements in the classified
section of various Sunday newspapers to be either “questionable or
blatantly illegal.”45 Of these discriminatory advertisements, 90
percent discriminated based on sex, whether for men or women.46 In
the United Kingdom, researchers noted a decline in the number of
advertisements with age preferences from 1981 to 1991, suggesting
that one form of illegal discrimination was on the wane but still
evident.47
More recently, it has become common for U.S. employers to
counter discriminatory preferences in job advertisements. Companies
and organizations now routinely state that they are “Title IX”
employers, or otherwise encourage applications from women and
minority candidates.48 Whether this change reflects greater tolerance
by employers or a heightened recognition of the value (moral,
economic, or otherwise) of a diverse workforce remains an open
question. Alternatively, this greater openness could simply respond
“to tightened government regulation and threats of lawsuits.”49
Whatever the underlying reason, a notable shift away from
discriminatory job advertisements is clearly detectable in the United
States and United Kingdom.
China presents a far different picture, as recent studies show.
Zhihong Gao’s study of online recruiting50 and Zhou Wei’s research on

44.
John P. Kohl et al., The Ongoing Battle of Discrimination in Help Wanted
Ads, 15 BUS. FORUM 8, 9 (1990).
45.
Id. at 10.
46.
Id. at 11.
47.
Ann E. McGoldrick & James Arrowsmith, Recruitment Advertising:
Discrimination on the Basis of Age, 15 EMP. REL. 54, 55 (1993).
48.
See, e.g., Recruiting and Hiring Policy, VANDERBILT UNIV. (Sept. 1, 2009),
http://hr.vanderbilt.edu/POLICIES/hr-017.pdf.
Vanderbilt University and Medical Center are committed to ensuring equal
employment opportunities. In compliance with federal law, including the
provisions of TITLE IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Sections 503
and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, Vanderbilt University does not discriminate . . . .
Id.
49.
Zhihong Gao, Gender Discrimination in Chinese
Advertisements: A Content Analysis, 9 J. ASIA-PAC. BUS. 395, 404 (2008).
50.
Id.
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print advertisement51 suggest that age, gender, and physical
appearance remain critical criteria for employers. Other factors, such
as household registration and height, appear less frequently than age
and gender, instead surfacing in more specialized or exotic
Many advertisements contained multiple forms of
positions.52
discrimination—women under the age of thirty, men over 5’5”—so
these categories should not be thought of in isolation.53
Gao surveyed 955 white-collar job advertisements on
ChinaHR.com, a leading employment website.54 She found that the
most frequently cited discriminatory basis was age, which appeared
in 24.2 percent of the ads, followed by gender (12.3 percent), and
physical appearance (10.5 percent).55 Further deconstruction of the
categories led to interesting, if predictable, results. For example,
gender restrictions targeted both men (5.5 percent) and women (6.7
percent); most of the former were for managerial positions, while
most of the latter were for sales and clerical positions.56 These
advertisements reinforce the traditional power structure that
subordinates women to men. Moreover, many ads for women
contained other restrictions, such as age (typically under thirty) and
appearance (“‘good looking,’ ‘having a nice image,’ ‘tall enough’”).57
This multiplicity of restrictions suggests “a more demeaning
dimension to gender discrimination” in China, namely that Chinese
women “are treated . . . as sex objects . . . to please the eyes of male
bosses and clients.”58
Other surveys of China’s advertising reveal that age and gender
weigh heavily on employers’ minds. One study surveyed 568 firms
across eight different job sectors, including goods and manufacturing,
research and development, commerce and logistics, finance and public
finance, and administrative and personnel.59 To ensure a broad

51.
Ning Xueling & Zhao Tieshan, 1995-2005-nian Shanghaishi he Chengdushi
Baokan Guanggao Yaoqiu Laodongzhe yu Gangwei Zhize Wuguande Tiaojian Tubiao
[Charts on Conditions Irrelevant to Professional Responsibilities of Laborers and
Positions Sought in Shanghai and Chengdu Print Job Advertisements from 1995 to
2005], in FANQISHIFA YANJIU: LIFA LILUN YU ANLI [STUDIES ON ANTIDISCRIMINATION
LAW: LEGISLATION, THEORY & CASES] 338 (Zhou Wei ed., 2008).
52.
Id. at 369, 390. Ning and Zhao surveyed 242,520 advertisements from four
newspapers (two in Shanghai, two in Chengdu) over a ten-year period. Id. at 338–39,
345. Age, academic background, and work experience were among the most prevalent
preferences that appeared in print. On the other hand, height restrictions appeared in
3.4 percent of the advertisements, while household registration restrictions appeared
in 7.8 percent. Id. at 369, 390.
53.
Id. at 347.
54.
Zhihong Gao, supra note 49, at 405.
55.
Id. at 406–07.
56.
Id. at 407.
57.
Id. at 411.
58.
Id.
59.
See Zhu Aisheng, Sun Weixiang & Zhao Butong, Zhaopinzhong Qishi
Xianxiangde Shizheng Yanjiu [An Empirical Study of Discriminatory Phenomena in
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snapshot of discrimination, the authors surveyed state-owned
enterprises, collective enterprises, privately owned companies, foreign
invested companies, and shareholding companies.60 Again, age was
the preeminent factor, appearing in 54.4 percent of the
advertisements examined.61 Among the more discriminatory sectors
were finance, administration and personnel, and commerce and
logistics; in these sectors, over half of the advertisements contained
age restrictions, targeting candidates who were either eighteen to
twenty years old or, somewhat more commonly, twenty-five to thirtyfive years old.62 By contrast, few employers specifically targeted
persons aged thirty-five to forty-five years old or forty-five and over.63
Gender was a less prominent factor than age, but the use of
gender varied considerably across sectors. Certain sectors preferred
men. Twenty-two percent of the advertisements in production
required men, while only four percent required women.64 Research
and development was similarly skewed: 14 percent required men,
while only 2 percent required women.65 Commerce and logistics
likewise favored men by a ratio of 28 percent to 6 percent.66
However, other sectors sought women: administrative and personnel
preferred women by a ratio of 31 percent to 8 percent, and education
and hygiene preferred women by a ratio of 30 percent to 6 percent.67
These statistics certainly support the idea that men are preferred in
industries that require physical labor or scientific skills, while women
are valued for administrative skills or ability to teach.
Although somewhat less prevalent than age or gender, hukou
status also matters to many employers. Statistical evidence is
limited, but one survey of Chongqing showed that only 7 percent of
positions contained hukou restrictions, but that over 20 percent of
employers restricted labor in this way.68 The author of the survey
conducted phone interviews with twenty of the employers that

Recruitment], 20 SHENGCHANLI YANJIU [STUD. ON PRODUCTION] 74, 74 (2007) (including
slashes in the categories themselves).
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Id. Several of the bases discussed in this Article—such as academic
background, professional title, or work experience—would not constitute discrimination
under U.S. law. This reveals an important difference in American and Chinese
conceptions of discrimination.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Yuan Weiqin, Chongqing Wailai Wugong Jiuye Qishi Diaocha [Survey of
Employment Discrimination Against Chongqing’s Outside Workers], in JINZHI JIUYE
QISHIDE FALÜ ZHIDU YU ZHONGGUODE XIANSHI [LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT & CHINA’S REALITY] 171, 183–84 (Zhou Wei et al.
eds., 2008) (presenting research that indicates 683 of 9,606 positions contained such
restrictions, while 142 employers out of 683 implemented such restrictions).
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included these restrictions. When asked why they discriminated
against outsiders, the employers’ responses included: (1) “We don’t
know what to make of outside laborers; we do not know if they are
thieves or hooligans”; (2) “We have never hired outsiders, nor thought
to hire them”; (3) outsiders require a certain period of time to
acclimate to Chongqing; and (4) “Outsiders’ habits are different from
ours. . . . We hired one before, but he was stubborn as a mule.”69
Whether based on ignorance or limited experience, the prevailing
attitudes in at least one of China’s metropolitan areas suggest a deep
prejudice toward outside labor.
A culture of discrimination has congealed at the first step of the
Chinese hiring process, presaging a process replete with
discrimination. Little wonder that workspaces in China are so clearly
gendered, with men occupying posts at the managerial levels and
women suffusing the lower rungs of the service sector.70 Although
the evidence is more limited, negative attitudes toward “outsiders”
(Chinese citizens with non-local residency status) likewise
characterize many employers. If China seriously intends to be rid of
employment discrimination, some effort must be made to end
discriminatory advertisements, which both naturalize and reproduce
artificially segregated workspaces.
B. Statistics
Statistical surveys provide another glimpse at the problem of
employment discrimination. Surveys usefully reflect both reality
(which groups work at what levels of society) and perceptions of
reality (have you ever been discriminated against?). Both reality and
its perception are critical in understanding discrimination because of
the important role that perception plays in perpetuating
discrimination.
In May 2006, scholars at China University of Political Science
and Law interviewed 3,500 people about their attitudes and
experiences with discrimination in ten large cities: Beijing,
Guangzhou, Nanjing, Wuhan, Shenyang, Xi’an, Chengdu, Zhengzhou,
Yinchuan, and Qingdao.71
The results provide a relatively

69.
Id. at 185.
70.
Given the Chinese preference for numerical slogans, it is no surprise that
scholars have described this phenomenon as “the three manys and the three fews.”
Namely, “many deputies, but few executives; many low-level workers, few high-level
workers; many idle, few busy.” See generally Yi Xiaorong, Zhongguo Funü Quanyi
Baohu Tanwei: yi Falü Yuanyuan wei Shijiao [A Micro-Exploration of the Protection of
Chinese Women’s Rights and Interests: From the Perspective of Legal Sources], in
SHEHUI XINGBIE PINGDENG YU FALÜ: YANJIU HE DUICE [GENDER EQUALITY AND LAW:
RESEARCH AND SOLUTIONS] 17, 22 (Jia Lin & Jiang Xiuhua eds., 2007) [hereinafter
GENDER EQUALITY].
71.
Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Xianzheng Yanjiusuo [Constitution Research Ctr.
of the China Univ. of Politics and Law], Zhongguo Shida Chengshi Jiuye Qishi
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comprehensive picture of the circumstances of discrimination in
today’s China.
When asked if there is discrimination in employment today, 85.5
percent responded affirmatively, while 50.8 percent of respondents
believed that discrimination was “extremely severe.”72 A mere 6.6
percent replied that there was no discrimination.73 Similarly, a
majority of respondents (54.9 percent) believed that they had
personally experienced some kind of discrimination in the hiring
process,74 and almost one-sixth (15.7 percent) of respondents had
experienced “very severe” or “relatively severe” discrimination.75
Further breakdown of the types of discrimination is also
revealing. According to 62.6 percent of respondents, the most
common form of discrimination is academic discrimination, meaning
that the employer overemphasizes a candidate’s academic
background or that the educational requirement exceeds the actual
necessities of the job.76 Health discrimination came in second at 47.7
percent, followed by appearance (36.7 percent), age (32.9 percent),
household registration status (28.7 percent), and finally sex (21
percent).77 Although this study did not find that sex discrimination is
a particularly widespread strain of employment discrimination, other
studies have concluded otherwise.
For instance, in a survey
conducted by the Women’s Federation of Jiangsu Province, 80 percent
of female college students had been rejected for a position due to their
gender, and over one-third of these women had multiple rejections of
this sort.78
Likewise, the China Women’s Federation, together with the
National Bureau of Statistics, conducted national surveys on women’s
employment and social status in 1990 and 2000.79 Over the course of
that decade, employment rates for men and women dropped, but the
decline was steeper for women.80 In 1990, 90 percent of men were
employed, but that number fell to 81.5 percent in 2000 (constituting a

Zhuangkuang Wenjuan Diaocha [Questionnaire Survey on the Situation of Employment
Discrimination in Ten Large Chinese Cities], in ZHONGGUO JIUYE QISHI XIANZHUANG JI
FANJIUYE DUIXIANG [EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN CHINA: CURRENT CONDITIONS
AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STRATEGIES] 505 (Cai Dingjian ed., 2007) [hereinafter
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN CHINA].
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Zhang Lixia, Shilun Woguo Funü Jiuyequande Falü Baohu [Theorizing
Legal Protection of Chinese Women’s Employment Rights], HENAN DAXUE XUEBAO
(SHEHUI KEXUEBAN) [HENAN U. J. (SOC. SCI. ED.)], Jan. 2004, at 104 & n.2.
79.
Yi Xiaorong, supra note 70, at 22.
80.
See Jiang Yongping, Presentation on the Situation of Chinese Gender
Equality and Gender Equality Promotion Policies (PowerPoint on file with author).
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9 percent decrease).81 By comparison, 76.3 percent of women were
employed in 1990, but that number fell to 63.7 percent in 2000
(representing a 13 percent decrease).82 For young and middle-aged
urban women, the employment rate dropped from 80 percent to 72
percent.83 Women also accounted for a larger proportion of those laid
off (56 percent), even though they make up a minority of the work
force.84
Local surveys also indicate the relative absence of women in
positions of leadership. Hebei Province, for example, conducted a
survey of government employment in 1994.85 The percentage of
women in high-level management positions—whether in government
enterprises, agencies, or institutions—was well below 1 percent.86 A
more recent survey found that only 4.1 percent of top leaders in
government were women.87
The situation is not much better for carriers of infectious disease,
especially China’s 120 million HBV carriers. Yirenping, a leading
NGO that advocates on behalf of people with HBV, has recently
surveyed the hiring practices of multinational corporations with
offices in China.88 According to a 2006 survey, 77 percent of
multinational corporations claimed that they would refuse applicants
carrying HBV.89 Two years later, the same survey found that (a) 84
percent of multinationals still require job applicants to take physical
examinations and submit the results, and (b) 44 percent would still
turn down applicants who tested positive.90 The 33 percent decrease
from 2006 to 2008 is a positive development, but the fact that 44
percent would still discriminate, even though such discrimination is
now clearly illegal after the 2007 Employment Promotion Law,91 is
surprising. It suggests, among other things, that foreign corporations
are either unaware of legal developments in Chinese labor law or
unconcerned about their consequences.92

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Yi Xiaorong, supra note 70, at 22.
Id.
Yong-Qing Fang, Women’s Development in Hebei Province, PRC, in
EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN, supra note 18, at 157, 157.
86.
Id. at 162.
87.
Yong-Qing Fang et al., supra note 18, at 65 (citing a 2003 survey).
88.
Discrimination Against Hepatitis B Carriers Rising—Survey, CHINA DAILY,
Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/05/content_7542374.htm.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. The second survey was conducted from October to December of 2008. Id.
91.
See Jiuye Cujin Fa [Employment Promotion Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007) art. 30 (banning discrimination
against carriers of infectious diseases).
92.
Chinese public sector employers, on the other hand, are perhaps more
enlightened. The majority of cases I have found online target corporations, Chinese or
foreign. See Appendix. Moreover, five government departments conducted a “knowledge
competition,” complete with prizes, concerning the contents of the Labor Contract Law
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Likewise, scholars have conducted independent research on
various subpopulations in China. Ye Jingyi and Shi Yuxiao surveyed
carriers of the hepatitis B virus about their experiences with
employment discrimination.93 Over half of the respondents (52.3
percent) claimed that they had been refused a job.94 Of these people,
72.3 percent claimed they were denied the job because they failed to
pass a physical examination,95 while only 11.7 percent believed the
denial was for another reason.96 Over half of respondents (56.3
percent) claimed to have experienced some form of discrimination
while on the job, while almost one-third (32 percent) had been fired at
one time.97 In this last category, over 70 percent of respondents
claimed that their employers told them the truth—that they were
fired because they carried the hepatitis B virus—while 18.8 percent
said their employer used an excuse to terminate them.98
Statistics offer another window into the realities of employment
discrimination, illuminating the experiences of employees and
applicants, as well as the attitudes and perceptions of employers and
society at large. A degree of subjectivity infuses many of these
surveys, reflecting the nature of discrimination itself. The experience
of discrimination presumably involves subjective determinations by
job applicants who feel discriminated against, particularly if the
reason for their refusal is never explicitly stated, but it also
presumably includes conscious and unconscious discrimination by
employers, who may be unaware of their own biases. Still, the
surveys make clear that discrimination (perceived and otherwise) is
widespread, affecting various groups of people.
C. Personal Experiences
Although unverifiable through statistical means or numerical
measures, anecdotal experience rounds out the portrait of

and Employment Promotion Law in November and December 2007. Three of the eighty
questions concerned employment discrimination. Wubumen Lianhe Juban Laodong
Hetong Fa he Jiuye Cujin Fa Zhishi Jingsai [Five Bureaus Unite to Conduct a
Knowledge Competition on the Labor Contract Law and the Employment Promotion
Law], LAODONG BAOZHANGBU WANGZHAN [DEP’T OF LABOR & SOC. SEC.] (Nov. 11,
2007), http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2007-11/05/content_796320.htm.
93.
Ye Jingyi & Shi Yuxiao, You Canji Qishi Dao Jiankang Qishi [From
Disability Discrimination to Health Discrimination], in JINZHI JIUYE QISHI: GUOJI
BIAOZHUN HE GUONEI SHIJIAN [EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS & NATIONAL PRACTICE] 318–19 (Li Weiwei & Lisa Stearns eds., 2006).
94.
Id.
95.
Id. The Chinese hiring process typically involves three examinations. If one
passes the written examination, she may then be invited for an oral examination. If
successful at this stage, the candidate then must typically go for a physical
examination at a nearby hospital.
96.
Id. at 319.
97.
Id.
98.
Id.
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discrimination. Personal narratives convey three related themes.
First, they bring to light actual techniques used by employers to
exclude qualified candidates. Second, when repeated across time and
space, anecdotal experience illuminates which forms of discrimination
are most prevalent. Third, and with the first two factors in mind,
such narratives can guide discussions of ways to stop discrimination
in the workplace. For example, if employers can pose personal
questions to female job applicants during an interview—about
marital status, boyfriends, plans to have children, and so on—women
face a substantial barrier to securing employment. Although dozens
of anecdotes portray the actualities of hiring, two in particular shed
light on the techniques used to weed out women.
First, a female job applicant e-mailed her résumé to a
company.99 She did not indicate her sex on the application, and she
did not include a photograph, a common accompaniment of many job
applications in China. The employer called her the next morning,
telling her that she did not include a photograph. The applicant
offered to send one off right away, but the employer stalled, saying
they still wanted to “research other applications.” She never heard
back from the company, but she believes that the company liked her
résumé. Upon realizing she was female—as they could determine
through the phone call—they lost interest. The authors of the study
from which this anecdote is drawn suggest that this technique is
commonly used to ferret out female candidates, and that it
constitutes a form of sex discrimination.100
Second, a female law graduate described her classmate’s
interview with a small company.101 The interview centered around
three questions: “Are you married?”; “Do you have a boyfriend?”; and
“How much do you want for a salary?”102 Interviewers frequently
question women about childcare or pregnancy (planned or past),
questions that would be illegal under U.S. law.103 They either ask
these questions directly or ask if the applicant would be willing to

99.
Tong Xin & Liang Meng, Tamen Weihe Chenmo: Nüdaxuesheng Zai Qiuzhi
Guochengzhong Suozaoshoude Xingbie Qishi Yanjiu [Why Do They Keep Silent:
Research on the Gender Discrimination Encountered by Female College Graduates in
the Hiring Process], in XINGBIE PINGDENGDE FALÜ YU ZHENGCE: GUOJI SHIYE YU
BENTU SHIJIAN [LAW AND POLICIES TOWARDS GENDER EQUALITY: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES AND LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION] 243, 251 (Tan Lin & Du Jie eds., 2008).
100.
Id.
101.
Id. at 254.
102.
Id.
103.
See King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 259 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984)
(“We note that . . . questions about pregnancy and childbearing would be unlawful per
se in the absence of a bona fide occupational qualification.”); see also id. (emphasizing
that questions about childcare are technically neutral, but may disparately impact
women).

2011]

Employment Discrimination in China

663

move around to different cities with the job; if the applicant is
unwilling to move, the employer will ask if she has a boyfriend.104
Although this may seem like an unwelcome intrusion into the
applicant’s personal life, employers are not simply being nosy.
Because employers typically pay for the ninety days of maternity
leave required by the Labor Law, many profit-minded employers
would prefer to avoid this liability altogether.105 Therefore, the
extirpation of discrimination against women will likely require a
change in thinking about responsibilities for child care (a normative
matter) and the reallocation of the costs of providing maternity leave
and child care (a policy matter).
With some understanding of the manifestations of employment
discrimination and a basic grasp of their underlying rationales, Part
III turns to the laws that both proscribe and promote discrimination.
III. THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Antidiscrimination Law
In the 1990s, Chinese law began to guarantee equal rights in
employment. The 1990 Law to Protect Disabled Persons mandated
that “[n]o discrimination shall be practiced against disabled persons
in recruitment, employment, obtaining permanent status, technical
or professional titles, payment,” and other areas.106 The 1992 Law on
the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women (Women’s Law) first
extended protections to women in numerous areas of employment,
including hiring and firing; titles, promotions, and salaries; and
marriage, pregnancy, and nursing.107 Likewise, the 1994 Labor Law
ensured that workers “regardless of their ethnic group, race, sex, or
religious belief, shall not be discriminated against in employment.”108
Despite these provisions, however, employers could discriminate with
impunity against any protected class because the mechanisms to
implement these laws were either weak or nonexistent.109 Unlike the

104.
Tong Xin & Liu Meng, supra note 99, at 254.
105.
See Laodong Fa [Labor Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) art. 62 (“Female staff and workers
shall be entitled to no less than ninety days of maternity leaves for childbirth . . . .”).
106.
Canjiren Baozhang Fa [Law on the Protection of Disabled Persons]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 1990, effective May
15, 1991) art. 34.
107.
See, e.g., Funü Quanyi Baozhang Fa [Law on the Protection of Women’s
Rights and Interests] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr.
3, 1992, effective Oct. 1, 1992) arts. 24–26 (guaranteeing equal pay for equal work); id.
art. 25 (guaranteeing equality in post, rank, and titles); id. art. 26 (providing “special
protection during menstrual period, pregnancy, obstetrical period and nursing period”).
108.
Labor Law art. 12.
109.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN CHINA, supra note 71, at 39.
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United States, China does not have an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to investigate allegations of employment
discrimination. Moreover, China lacks implementing regulations or
judicial interpretations that tell courts how to handle employment
discrimination claims or remedy successfully litigated claims.110
Indeed, some courts refuse to accept employment discrimination
claims on the grounds that they are not listed in the Regulation on
the Causes of Action for Civil Cases, issued by the Supreme People’s
Court.111
In summary, before the passage of the Employment Promotion
Law (EPL) in 2007, Chinese law proscribed employment
discrimination but offered very little by way of remediation. Before
turning to the impact of the EPL, however, it is first necessary to
examine the obverse of Chinese antidiscrimination law: laws
promoting discrimination.
B. Discriminatory Laws and Their Repeal
The Chinese government, both at the central and local levels,
has promulgated a number of laws, regulations, and ordinances that
exclude persons from certain jobs, force women to retire early, or
otherwise disadvantage certain applicants based on immutable
characteristics.
State-sponsored discrimination both naturalizes
discriminatory practices and perpetuates the marginalization of
various groups outside the power structures of Chinese society. The
continued development of antidiscrimination law requires a careful
review of the underlying rationales for discriminatory laws, a
comparison of these rationales with contemporary realities, and a
decision as to whether amendment or withdrawal may be
appropriate. Many policies developed in the 1950s—when the PRC
was a new country inculcating a revolutionary spirit in its people—no
longer match contemporary realities.
In some instances, the
government has already responded with appropriate changes, often
after sustained pressure from the public, petition drives, and media
scrutiny. This work should continue, either through incremental
revisions or by passing an all-encompassing antidiscrimination
law.112 This Part outlines some of the major laws and policies that
promote discrimination based on gender, hukou status, and infectious
disease. It then discusses recent changes or revisions to these
discriminatory laws and policies.

110.
Interview with Liu Minghui, Professor, China Women’s College (Mar. 18,
2009). Other courts have, of course, accepted such cases as falling within the “other
torts” category.
111.
Id.
112.
Scholar Zhou Wei has drafted a comprehensive antidiscrimination law (on
file with author).
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1A. Gender Discrimination
A number of Chinese laws promote employment discrimination
against women. The most widely cited is the differential retirement
age, which mandates that women must retire before men. In 1958,
China’s highest executive body, the State Council, issued Temporary
Guidelines Handling the Retirement of Workers and Professionals,
which initially set the differential retirement ages.113 Although these
“temporary” guidelines were withdrawn in 2001, other State Council
Guidelines from the 1970s propagated this practice into the
present.114
Differential retirement ages may have made sense in the 1950s.
Under the influence of the Soviet Union, and with a mind toward
protecting women, not inhibiting gender equality, China passed a
differential retirement age for men and women.115 Because women
needed time for maternity leave, maternal protections, and raising
children, it was “reasonable” for them to work less and retire
earlier.116 In the immediate post-revolutionary period, traditional
notions about the division of labor still prevailed, despite some
revolutionary stirrings about the proper role of women.117 In
practice, however, during that period women handled more of the
domestic responsibilities, and men provided for the family through
outside work.118

113.
Guowuyuan Guanyu Gongren, Zhiyuan Tuixiu Chuli de Zanxing Guiding
[State Council’s Temporary Guidelines Handling the Retirement of Workers and
Professionals] (promulgated Nov. 16, 1957, withdrawn Oct. 6, 2001) art. 2. Article 2(1)
set the retirement age for male workers and professionals at 60 years, female workers
at 50 years, and female professionals at 55 years. In addition, for particularly laborious
work, such as jobs at high altitudes or high temperatures, the retirement age for men
was 55 years, and 45 years for women. Id. art. 2(2).
114.
See infra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
115.
Peng Xizhe, Yunyong Shehui Zhengce Gongju Tuijin Shehui Xingbie
Pingdeng: Yi dui Zhongguo Yanglao Zhidude Fenxi Weili [Using Social Policy Tools to
Promote Gender Equality], in GENDER EQUALITY, supra note 70, at 27, 34.
116.
See Laodongbu Bangongting, Guowuyuan Renshiju, Quanguo Zonggonggui
Laodong Baoxianbu Guanyu Gongren, Zhiyuan Tuixiu Chuli Zanxing Guidingde Wenti
Jieda [Answers to Questions on Temporary Regulations Related to Handling the
Retirement of Workers and Professionals from the General Office of the Ministry of
Labor, the Bureau of Personnel of the State Council, and the Labor Insurance
Department of the National Federation of Trade Unions], as cited in Chen Weimin & Li
Ying, Tuixiu Nianling Dui Zhongguo Chengzhen Zhigong Yanglaojin Xingbie Chayide
Yingxiang Fenxi [An Analysis of the Influence of the Retirement Age on Gender
Differences in Pensions of Chinese Urban Workers and Professionals], in GENDER
EQUALITY, supra note 70, at 39, 45.
117.
See Chen Weimin & Li Ying, Tuixiu Nianling Dui Zhongguo Chengzhen
Zhigong Yanglaojin Xingbie Chayide Yingxiang Fenxi [An Analysis of the Influence of
the Reitrement Age on Gender Differences in Pensions of Chinese Urban Workers and
Professionals], in GENDER EQUALITY, supra note 70, at 39, 45 (describing the rationale
for a post-revolutionary law on women’s retirement age).
118.
Feng Yuan, Cong Tongling Tuixiude Zhenglun Kan Gonggong Zhengcede
Juece Guocheng [Looking at Decisional Process in Public Policy from the Point of View
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A generation later, in 1978, the State Council issued another set
of “temporary” guidelines, both of which mandated differential
retirement ages and remain in effect: the Temporary Measures on the
Retirement and Resignation of Workers (Workers’ Measures) and the
Temporary Measures on the Proper Arrangement of the Elderly,
Weak, Infirm and Disabled Cadres (Cadres’ Measures).119 The
Workers’ Measures provide that “Workers in state-owned enterprises,
institutional units, government or [communist] party organs, or mass
organizations must retire upon reaching any of the following
conditions: (1) males reaching 60 years, and females reaching 50
years, after they have worked continuously for ten years.”120 The
Cadres’ Measures, on the other hand, provide that “Cadres working
in party or government organs, mass organizations, enterprises or
institutional units can retire upon reaching any of the following
conditions: (1) males reaching 60 years, and females reaching 55
years, after they have participated in revolutionary work for ten
years.”121 In other words, the retirement age for men is sixty
whether they are cadres or workers, whereas female cadres must
retire at fifty-five and female workers at fifty. It is important to note
that private companies are not bound by either directive, although
they frequently force women to retire before men.122
By law, then, many female professionals are let go upon reaching
the age of fifty-five. But many female professionals have been
misclassified as workers, either because they were wrongly classified
when they began their jobs in the 1980s, or because they have
elevated to professional status over the course of their careers.123
Doctors, teachers, accountants, journalists, health care professionals,
and many others are fired at the age of fifty.124 Moreover, when they
sue in court, or pursue labor arbitration, these women face

of the Controversy on Retiring at the Same Age], in GENDER EQUALITY, supra note 70, at
61, 62.
119.
See infra notes 120–21.
120.
Guowuyuan Guanyu Gongren Tuixiu, Tuizhide Zanxing Banfa [State
Council’s Interim Procedures on the Retirement and Resignation of Workers] (June 13,
1978) (emphasis added), available at http://law.cctv.com/program/xyh/topic/C195
62/20071017/104947.shtml.
121.
Guowuyuan Guanyu Anzhi Laoruobingcan Ganbude Zanxing Banfa [State
Council’s Interim Measures on the Proper Arrangement of the Elderly, Weak, Infirm
and Disabled Cadres] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June
2, 1978) (emphasis added).
122.
Interview with Guo Huimin, Professor, Northwest Polytechnical Univ.,
Sept. 22, 2009. Professor Guo explained that women may make more money from social
security than from their working wage. From the company’s perspective, replacing
older employees with younger ones can significantly lower payroll expenditures.
123.
GUO JIANMEI, WOMEN WATCH—CHINA, CASE STUDIES OF EARLY
RETIREMENT OF FEMALE PROFESSIONAL & TECHNICAL PERSONNEL IN CHINA 3 (2008).
124.
Id. at 3.
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insurmountable obstacles, often because the decision to fire them is
authorized by local government policy.125
Differential age restrictions harm women in several ways. First,
for many women, their professional lives may only begin to blossom
at age fifty, particularly if they deferred professional commitments to
raise children, obtain advanced degrees, or both. To require women
to retire at fifty-five, five years before their male counterparts,
nullifies a lifetime of toil, trouble, and deferred gratification.
Second, retirement pensions are tied directly to the number of
years worked. If a woman retires five to ten years before a man, her
pension will be somewhere between 7 percent and 20 percent less
than a man’s.126 This ensures that differential treatment persists
long after retirement.
In addition to early retirement, Chinese law also prohibits
women from engaging in certain jobs, including working in mines,127
felling and stacking timber, setting up scaffolding, demolishing
buildings, working on electric power lines, and other jobs requiring
The labor regulations
dangerous or intense physical labor.128
establish broader protections for menstruating women, pregnant
women, and nursing mothers, who are barred from working in walkin refrigerators, cold water, or other jobs involving low
temperatures.129 It is unclear whether this form of paternalism is
any more justifiable than the concerns underlying the early
retirement system. Some test of strength, stamina, or agility would
better replicate a person’s physical capacities than a blanket ban.
Although arguably well intended, these regulations underscore the
general notion that women are not fit for the workplace, or some
sizable fraction of it.
Local regulations likewise discriminate against women. In 2003,
Hunan published Temporary Measures for Physical Examinations of
Civil Servants, which apply to civil servants and those working in
state-sponsored institutions such as universities and hospitals.130
The Hunan guidelines require that women who work in a medical
facility’s gynecological department have “normally developed
secondary sexual characteristics; symmetrical breasts without lumps;
vulva [that is not] inflamed, ulcerous or tumorous; and uterus [that is

125.
Id. at 4.
126.
Chen Weimin & Li Ying, supra note 117, at 46.
127.
Laodong Fa [Labor Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) art. 59.
128.
Nüzhigong Jinji Laodong Fanweide Guiding [Regulation on the Scope of
Prohibited Labor for Female Workers] (promulgated by the Ministry of Labor, Jan. 18,
1990) art. 4 (establishing a blanket ban on these and other activities).
129.
Id.
130.
Cai Dingjian, Fanjiuye Qishi Zhonghe Yanjiu Baogao [Overview Report of
Employment Discrimination], in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN CHINA, supra note
71, at 5, 23.
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not] prolapsed.”131 This regulation certainly sounds like per se
discrimination, at least to one trained in U.S. antidiscrimination law,
because there are no corresponding anatomical specifications for male
workers. As they stand, these requirements heighten the burden on
women, subjecting their bodies to notions of anatomical correctness
that have no bearing on their ability to perform the job. Moreover,
this regulation might eliminate disabled persons and breast cancer
survivors, suggesting multiple forms of discrimination.
1B. Efforts to Reform Gender Discrimination
The most significant legal reform in the area of women’s rights
generally,132 and discrimination specifically, was the 2005 revision of
the Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests (Revised
Women’s Law).133 This law addresses several weaknesses in China’s
existing legal structure, such as the underrepresentation of women in
national and local politics, the fragility of women’s property rights,
and the prevalence of sexual harassment in the workplace.134 For the
first time,135 the law explicitly states that the promotion of equality
between men and women is a basic “state policy,” lending additional
rhetorical support to a position that the government has long
exhorted.136
A group of elite scholars and officials began drafting revisions to
the existing law in 2003, drawing heavily on international and
comparative experience.137
This group included members of

131.
Id.
132.
To be sure, other areas of gender reform are important, including the
passage of regulations on domestic violence by the Supreme People’s Court and
Ministry of Public Security. But these do not focus specifically on the issue of
discrimination or employment discrimination. See Sheji Jiating Baoli Hunyin Anjian
Shenli Zhinan [Adjudication Guidance on Cases Involving Domestic Violence in
Marriage] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 16, 2008).
133.
Funü Quanyi Baozhang Fa [Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights &
Interests] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 3, 1992,
amended Aug. 28, 2005, effective Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.npv.gov.cn/
englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1383859.htm.
134.
See Rong Jiaojiao, Law Revised to Protect Women’s Rights, CHINA
FEATURES (Sept. 20, 2005), http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zt/t213042.htm
(“Another highlight is that sexual harassment, for the first time, is made unlawful
through legislation.”).
135.
Id.
136.
Funü Quanyi Baozhang Fa [Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights &
Interests] art. 2 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 3,
1992, amended Aug. 28, 2005, effective Dec. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.npv.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1383859.htm.
137.
See generally Rangita de Silva de Alwis, Opportunities & Challenges for
Gender-Based Legal Reform in China, 5 EAST ASIA L. REV. 197, 198–99 (2010) (“The
2005 amendments to the 1992 Law on the Protection of Women’s Right and Interests
(LPWRI) in China was a milestone law reform initiative. Since then, other genderbased law and policy reforms have spawned nationally and locally in the wake of the
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government-run entities like the All China Women’s Federation and
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, as well as civil society actors
such as the Center for Women’s Law and Legal Services at Peking
University.138 Through workshops, conferences, and roundtables,
these scholar-activists helped channel recommendations from United
Nations committees and other countries’ laws into the legislative
process of the PRC.139 Although not all their suggestions made it into
the law, they laid out several issues—including discrimination,
domestic violence, and property rights—for future regulations and
provincial implementation.
Despite various improvements made in the law, the Committee
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
issued a long list of concerns and recommendations in its 2006
Report.140 First, the Report expressed concern over China’s “capacity
to understand the meaning of substantive equality and nondiscrimination.”141 Because many Chinese still do not understand
the concept or problems of discrimination, the Report specifically
recommended that China include “a definition of discrimination
against women in its domestic law, encompassing both direct and
As we saw above in Part II,
indirect discrimination.”142
discrimination against women is quite widespread in China; one
reason may be a lack of understanding as to why discrimination is a
problem.
A second concern was the lack of “effective legal remedies” for
violations of the Women’s Convention,143 as well as a lack of
“awareness-raising and sensitization measures about such legal
remedies against discrimination so that women can avail themselves
of them.”144 Indeed, the lack of effective remedies and the general
failure to implement laws are constant criticisms leveled at the
Chinese legal system.145 As discussed in Part V, discrimination

LPWRI revisions, and have mobilized a slowly growing gender and law network in
China.”).
138.
Id. at 205.
139.
Id.
140.
See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rep. on
its 36th Sess., Aug. 7–25, 2006, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/6 (Aug. 25, 2006)
[hereinafter CEDAW Report] (“It calls upon the State party to submit the present
concluding comments to all relevant ministries and to Parliament so as to ensure their
full implementation.”).
141.
Id. ¶ 10.
142.
Id.
143.
Id. ¶ 11.
144.
Id. ¶ 12.
145.
See, e.g., Yuwen Li, Court Reform in China: Problems, Progress and
Prospects, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 55, 82
(Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2002) (noting that “the gap between law-making and law
enforcement by the courts has become more obvious” in recent years).
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against women continues in China, but no plaintiff has stepped
forward to challenge it.146
A third concern was “traditional stereotypes regarding the role of
women and men in society.”147 In other words, the divide between
men’s work and women’s work remains relatively clear in China, with
men occupying higher rungs and women down below. The Report
recommended a broad campaign of education and awareness raising,
particularly directed at men and boys, through radio, television, and
print media.148 The Report also suggested the inclusion of gender
sensitivity into school curriculum and textbooks.149 The Report made
other suggestions, but they lie beyond the scope of this Article.
Debate continues over the differential retirement age, but little
forward momentum is detectable. In April 2009, one of China’s most
senior female politicians, Chen Zhili, called on the city of Beijing to
take the lead in equalizing the retirement age for cadres.150 Noting
that Beijing’s decision to do so “would have a huge influence on the
rest of China,” Ms. Chen believed that leveling the retirement age
would greatly advance equality between the sexes.151 The mere fact
that a person of Ms. Chen’s stature would make such an appeal is
significant, and it indicates some level of support among Chinese
government officials. Still, the fact that this proposal has not moved
forward in over a year does not bode well for its implementation.
2A. Hukou Discrimination
The household registration, or hukou, system helps maintain the
physical separation of urban residents from their rural brethren.
Instituted in 1958, the system initially permitted the government to
distribute resources and benefits more effectively, to control
migration from rural areas to urban settings, and to keep closer tabs
on criminal activity.152 Citizens were categorized according to their
place of residence, as well as whether they were rural (“agricultural”)

146.
See infra Part V.B.
147.
See CEDAW Report, supra note 140, ¶ 17 (“The Committee is concerned
that these prevailing attitudes continue to devalue women and violate their human
rights.”).
148.
Id. ¶ 18.
149.
Id.
150.
See Zhang Haiyan, Quanguo Fulian Zhuxi Chen Zhili Huyu: Beijing
Shuaixian Shixing Nannü Tongling Tuixiu [Chairwoman of the All China Women’s
Federation Chen Zhili Calls on Beijing to Take the Lead in Implementing Equal
Retirement Age], FAZHIWANG [LEGAL DAILY], Apr. 3, 2009, http://www.legaldaily.com.
cn/0801/2009-04/03/content_1064630.htm (noting that the committee chairwoman
urged the city of Beijing to experiment with a workplace policy that calls for the same
retirement age for male and female upper level employees).
151.
Id.
152.
Migrant Workers in China, CHINA LAB. BULL. (June 6, 2008),
http://www.china-labour.org.hk/en/node/100259.
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or urban (“non-agricultural”).153 If a citizen had a Beijing hukou, for
instance, that citizen benefited from the panoply of benefits
(insurance, education, social welfare, and even food rations during
the PRC’s more tumultuous periods) that Beijing provided its
residents. If, on the other hand, you lived in Beijing without a
Beijing hukou, you did not have access to these services.154
In recent years, the system has relaxed somewhat.155 Wealthy
or educated rural residents can apply to become local residents of
various cities, depending upon criteria set out by the city.156 The
estimated 150 million migrants working in Chinese cities offer proof
that people are no longer as tightly bound to their native villages as
they were in the early days of the PRC.157 However, this change does
not mean that life has become any easier for today’s migrant workers.
Typically, they toil at low-wage jobs without social security, a
guaranteed wage, or access to medical care.158 Equally troubling,
their children are often ineligible to attend local schools, creating
another generation of marginalization.159
A number of regulations reinforce the hukou system and further
disadvantage migrant workers. National regulations, for instance,
instruct local employers—private, public, and state organs alike—on
how to hire workers who come from outside their locality.160 One
regulation from the Ministry of Labor provided that outside workers
could be hired only if no local person was qualified to fill the position
and the local labor and employment agencies approved the employer’s
request for an outside hire.161 In other words, local people were
preferred in job recruitment, and outsiders could fill positions only
when a local agency approved of the placement. Although this

153.
154.
155.

CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, supra note 24, at 2–3.
See id. at 7–8 (education).
See Hein Mallee, Migration, Hukou and Resistance, in CHINESE SOCIETY:
CHANGE, CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE 83, 99 (Elizabeth J. Perry & Mark Selden eds.,
2000) (describing the recent relaxation of the hukou system as a product of both stateinitiated changes and large-scale labor migration).
156.
See, e.g., CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, supra note 24, at 5 (noting that
Zhejiang Province allows individuals who have purchased a home of a certain price or
size to obtain a local hukou).
157.
China’s New-Generation Migrant Workers Number 100 Million, PEOPLE’S
DAILY ONLINE (June 22, 2010), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90782/7033
954.html (“Data from the National Bureau of Statistics shows that there were a total of
230 million rural migrant workers in China in 2009, including 150 million working
outside their hometowns.”).
158.
Migrant Workers in China, supra note 152.
159.
Id.
160.
See, e.g., Nongcun Laodongli Kuasheng Liudong Jiuye Guanli Zanxing
Guiding [Temporary Regulation on the Administration of Cross-Provincial
Employment of Rural Workers] (promulgated by the Ministry of Labor, Nov. 17, 1994,
withdrawn Feb. 7, 2005) art. 2. The regulations apply to private companies (qiye),
individual economic organizations and state organs, enterprise organizations, and
social groups. See id.
161.
Id. art. 5.
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regulation has since been withdrawn,162 it set a precedent to which
many cities have clung. Nanjing, for instance, still encourages
employers to hire local laborers: “first urban, then rural; first this
city, then other cities; first this province, then other provinces.”163 By
mandating “first this city, then other cities,”164 this principle
privileges not only Nanjing residents, but also any other urban
residents. This preference represents discrimination against rural
people in its purest form.
Other cities restrict migrant labor in even less nuanced ways.165
Some cities, either by enacting a strict numerical target or by setting
an acceptable percentage of outsiders in the total work force, impose
quotas on the number of outside workers allowed to work in the
city.166 Other cities prohibit or severely restrict the use of migrant
workers in specific positions. Shanghai, for instance, closed several
positions, including shop assistants, maintenance staff, and
custodians, to persons without local residency.167 Although these
positions are not high-status positions, they would likely appeal to
the frequently less educated and underprivileged migrant class.
More expansively, Beijing placed restrictions on various white-collar
positions, including administrators in the financial and insurance
sectors, accountants, bank tellers, and staff at “star-level” hotels.168
These regulations restrict the number of positions available to
migrant workers and steer them toward the most grueling jobs.

162.
Laodong he Shehui Baozhangbu Guanyu Feizhi ‘Nongcun Laodongli
Kuasheng Liudong Jiuye Guanli Zanxing Guiding’ ji Youguan Peitao Wenjiande
Tongzhi [Notice on the Abolishment of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security’s
‘Temporary Regulation on the Administration of Cross-Provincial Employment of Rural
Workers’ and Related Accompanying Documents] (promulgated by the Ministry of
Labor and Social Security, Feb. 7, 2005), available at http://fj.cq.gov.cn/wmfw/news/
2008-3/183_713.shtml. The regulation was withdrawn in 2005.
163.
Nanjingshi Wailai Laodongli Laodong Guanli Guiding [Nanjing
Regulations on Managing Labor of Outside Laborers] (promulgated by the Nanjing
City People’s Government, July 7, 1999, effective July 7, 1999) art. 6.
164.
Id.
165.
Bingqin Li, Urban Social Exclusion in Transitional China 22–23 (London
Sch. of Econ. Ctr. for Analysis of Soc. Exclusion, Paper No. 82, 2004),
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/CASEpaper82.pdf.
166.
Yao Guojian, Identity Discrimination in Employment—Household
Registration and Regional Origin, in TAKING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
SERIOUSLY: CHINESE AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 133, 136 (Yuwen Li & Jenny
Goldschmidt eds., 2009); Liu Xin, Dui Jiuye Qishi Xingzheng Fagui Guizhang Qingli
Baogao [A Report on Administrative Rules and Regulations in Employment
Discrimination], in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN CHINA, supra note 71, at 448,
453, 454.
167.
Bingqin Li, supra note 165, at 22.
168.
See Nian Benshi Yunxu he Xianzhi Shiyong Waidi Renyuan de Hangye
Gongzhong Fanwei [Scope of Jobs and Professions that Permit and Restrict the Usage
of Outside Personnel in Beijing in 1996] (promulgated by Beijing Labor Bureau, Mar.
28, 1996).
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Apart from job restrictions and prohibitions, cities also levy fees
on employers that hire outside workers; these fees fall under the
various guises of “registration fees,” “work management fees,”
“processing fees,” “administrative service fees,” and so on.169 The
effect is to drive up the cost of hiring outside workers and to
encourage the hiring of local employees.
Finally, cities may require migrant workers to obtain work
permits, residency permits, health permits, and other documentation
in order to work.170 The hassle of obtaining such permits, coupled
with the fear that one’s status as a non-resident is automatically
disqualifying, may dissuade many migrant workers from applying for
this paperwork. In this way, cities can prevent migrant workers from
taking up local posts and greatly restrict the number of eligible
candidates. At the same time, these regulations generate revenue
from people who can least afford it.171
2B. Efforts to Reform Hukou Discrimination
The new millennium has witnessed a number of reforms to the
hukou system. While these reforms were percolating in the 1990s,172
a wave of dissatisfaction hit the Chinese press in 2000.173 In
December 1999, the Beijing government published 103 additional job
categories from which migrant workers would be barred.174 After
vigorous academic debate, and most likely with the imprimatur of
high officials, Chinese newspapers ran editorials and personal pleas
from migrant workers that questioned the hukou system.175 One
editorial acknowledged the problem of local protectionism but
questioned whether senior officials had considered the national
picture.176 Another noted that China was “treating its precious labor
resources as a burden and inhibiting the economic interests, the very
livelihoods, of tens of millions of rural laborers.”177 News websites

169.
Liu Xin, supra note 166, at 454.
170.
Id.
171.
Yu Zhu, Liyue Lin & Bin Wang, Social Protection for Rural-Urban
Migrants in an Era of Increasing Population Mobility and Socioeconomic
Transformation: China’s Experience Since the Late 1970s, at 4 (Soc. Prot. in Asia,
Working Paper No. 3, 2009), http://www.socialprotectionasia.org/pdf/CPDR-SPA-WP
03.pdf.
172.
See FEI-LING WANG, supra note 23, at 187 (“These gradual and controlled
reforms have relaxed the hukou-based regulation of internal migration at the level of
small cities and towns yet have kept the quota-based migration restrictions largely
intact for large cities.”).
173.
See Erik Eckholm, China’s Controls on Rural Workers Stir Some Rarely
Seen Heated Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at A10.
174.
Id.
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
Id. (quoting a reader commentary from the China Youth Daily).
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and Internet bulletin boards also posted criticisms of the system and
calls for its reform.178
Over time, even the official state news media began to criticize
the hukou system. An article from People’s Daily made a number of
strong claims, such as (a) that residency and migration were “basic
rights” (with the implication that they should not to be violated by
state or local policy); (b) that the hukou system itself was
incompatible with China’s current economic development and
tarnished its image of reform and openness; (c) that the system
enabled corruption, as evident in the prevalence of bribes to officials
and the auctioning of local residency permits by small cities; and (d)
that abolishing the current system followed “the general trend of
history.”179 The article ambitiously predicted that the system would
one day be considered a relic of the planned economy.180
As noted, the central government had already initiated modest
reform efforts. In 1997, the State Council initiated an experimental
program permitting migrant workers to obtain local hukou in selected
small towns and cities.181 If they lived in the locality for at least two
years, with a stable income and a permanent residence, migrants
could apply for permanent residency.182 Over 540,000 migrants
became full residents in 328 cities,183 and this success lead the State
Council to expand the experiment to cover all small towns and
cities.184 Nevertheless, given the episodic nature of many migrant
workers’ work assignments (such as construction or infrastructure)
and the seasonal rhythms of their lives (returning home to their
native villages during holidays), these requirements still exclude
highly transient migrants, who are arguably the most precariously
positioned. Additionally, large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and
Shenzhen—each of which employs millions of migrant workers—were
exempt from the program.185

178.
See FEI-LING WANG, supra note 23, at 181–82.
179.
He Jun, Huji Zhidu Zuizhong Jiang Chengwei Jihua Jingjide Canyu
Biaozhi [In the End, the Hukou System Will Become a Vestige of the Planned Economy],
RENMIN RIBAO (Aug. 28, 2001).
180.
Id.
181.
Guowuyuan Pizhuan Gong’anbu Xiaochengzhen Huji Guanli Zhidu Gaige
Shidian Fang’an he Guanyu Wanshan Nongcun Huji Guanli Yijiande Tongzhi [State
Council Plan Approving the Public Security Bureau’s Experimental Plan of Reforming
the Management System for Residential Permits in Small Towns and Cities and Notice
of Opinions on Perfecting the Management System of Rural Residential Permits]
(promulgated by Ministry of Pub. Sec., May 20, 1997, effective June 10, 1997).
182.
Id. art. 3.
183.
FEI-LING WANG, supra note 23, at 187.
184.
Guowuyuan Pizhuan Gong’anbu Guanyu Tuijin Xiaochengzhen Huji Guanli
Zhidu Gaige Yijiande Tongzhi [State Council Notice Approving the Public Security
Bureau’s Opinions on Promoting Reform of the Management System for Residential
Permits in Small Towns and Cities] (Mar. 20, 2001).
185.
Id.
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The State Council continues to issue directives that relax the
hukou system and mitigate the discriminatory effects of various local
regulations. In 2003, for instance, it issued a Notice on Successfully
Managing Employment and Services for Migrant Workers.186 The
preface describes the current employment prospects for migrant
workers in unusually candid terms: they “still face a number of
irrational restrictions in employment; their rights and interests are
not effectively protected; they are not paid their due wages; they are
charged excessive fees; and they are subject to other serious
phenomena.”187 The Notice then calls on local governments to
“abolish irrational restrictions on the employment of migrant
workers,” including the abolishment of administrative approvals,
professional restrictions excluding migrants, and registration
requirements.188 It also mandates that local governments impose the
same technical qualifications and health standards on migrant
workers as on local residents.189 With the Notice, the central
government took a first step toward peeling away the encrustation of
discriminatory provisions that had piled up from the 1990s.
Subsequent regulations in 2004 and 2006 likewise target
discriminatory regulations. The 2004 Notice on Further Improving
the Employment Environment for Migrant Workers praises the
“large-scale work” of various cities and local departments since the
2003 Notice.190 But it also recognizes the manifold problems facing
migrant workers, which include inadequate training services and
recruitment opportunities, employment fees, numerous procedures,
unpaid wages, violations of their rights and interests, and “illegal
elements” who defraud migrant workers by charging recruitment fees
for nonexistent jobs.191 The 2004 Notice repeats, almost verbatim,
the 2003 Notice’s instruction to abolish administrative approvals,
professional restrictions, and registration requirements, but the 2004
Notice uses the terms “discriminatory regulations and irrational
restrictions,” an acknowledgment that these regulations offend both
morality and reason.192
In 2006, the State Council issued Certain Opinions on Resolving
Problems of Migrant Workers.193 The Opinions acknowledge the

186.
Zuohao Nongmin Jincheng Wugong Jiuye Guanli he Fuwu Gongzuode
Tongzhi [Notice on Successfully Managing Employment and Services for Migrant
Workers in Cities] (promulgated by State Council, Jan. 2003).
187.
Id. pmbl.
188.
Id. art. 2.
189.
Id.
190.
Jinyibu Zuohao Gaishan Nongmin Jincheng Jiuye Huanjing Gongzuo de
Tongzhi [Notice on Further Improving the Employment Environment for Migrant
Workers] (promulgated by State Council, Dec. 27, 2004).
191.
Id. pmbl.
192.
Id. art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
193.
Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiejue Nongmingong Wentide Ruogan Yijian [State
Council Opinions on Resolving Problems of Migrant Workers] (promulgated by State

676

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

[Vol. 44:643

“important contributions” that migrant workers have made to the
development of China and articulate a series of programmatic steps
to alleviate the burden of this disenfranchised subpopulation:
Migrant workers are a new labor force that has sprung up in the
processes of industrialization and urbanization during China’s reform
and opening up. Their residency status is rural, but they engage
primarily in non-agricultural production. Some go out to do both
industrial and agricultural work during the non-agricultural season,
and are very mobile. Others have been employed in cities for a long
time, and comprise a large proportion of industrial workers. A large
number of migrants work in cities and towns, where they have made
important contributions to the construction of a modern China.194

Article 5 of the Opinions sets out basic principles, such as “equal
treatment.” It calls on cities to “[r]espect and maintain migrant
workers’ legal rights, eliminate discriminatory regulations and
systemic obstacles to their working in cities, [and] permit them to
enjoy equal rights and obligations in urban professional
employment.”195 Other provisions address now-familiar dilemmas of
unpaid wages, labor contracts, employment services and training, and
social protections.196
But the problem, as the title intimates, is that these are merely
opinions. Although legally binding,197 they do not specify the
sanctions a court should impose upon finding a violation. As a result,
it is unlikely that a court of law would find against a municipality for
contravening these regulations. Like so much Chinese law, the
Opinions propose prohibitions but not sanctions to enforce them.
Despite some changes in the residency requirements, the
essential structure of the hukou system remains largely intact. By
dividing citizens into “agricultural” and “non-agricultural,” then
allocating resources unevenly between the city and countryside, the
PRC continues to reinforce the marginalization of hundreds of
millions of citizens. Although recent reform efforts aim to ameliorate
some of the discriminatory burdens that cities have attached to
migrant workers, the systemic discrimination remains untouched. By
permitting greater mobility than it did fifty years ago, China has

Council, Mar. 27, 2006). Article 5 lists the “Basic Principles,” the first of which reads
“Equal treatment. Respect and protect the legal rights and interests of migrant
workers; eliminate discriminatory regulations and systematic obstacles facing migrant
workers who work in cities; make them enjoy the same rights and obligations as city
residents in the professional fields.” Id. art. 5.
194.
Id. pmbl.
195.
Id. art. 5.
196.
Id. arts. 6, 8, 11–13, 16.
197.
See Wang Chenguang, Introduction: An Emerging Legal System, in
INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 1, 16 (Wang Chenguang & Zhang Xianchu eds., 1997)
(“According to the Constitution, the State Council has the legislative power to make
administrative regulations . . . . [which] are mandatory for the people’s courts to
follow . . . .”).
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slightly blurred the division between urbanites and villagers. Yet, as
one scholar concluded, “Chinese society by and large can still be
divided into an ‘agricultural’ segment and a ‘non-agricultural’ one,
and glaring differences remain in entitlements between the two.”198
3A. Discrimination Against Infectious Disease Carriers
With an estimated 120 million carriers of the hepatitis B
virus,199 4.5 million known cases of tuberculosis,200 and 700,000
carriers of HIV,201 a sizeable portion of the Chinese populace faces
the possibility of a different form of discrimination. Quite apart from
the public health concerns raised by these diseases, the Chinese
government has also had to deal with employment-related issues,
such as workplace safety and discrimination.202 For a long time, the
government’s thumb was decidedly on the side of public health and
safety. Numerous laws and regulations excluded qualified but
diseased persons from a variety of positions. Recent reform efforts,
however, suggest both a growing willingness to strengthen the rights
of disease carriers and a clearer awareness of the actual threat that
such persons pose to public safety generally and the workplace in
particular. Perhaps more importantly, citizen activism has played a
critical role in promoting reform; the mobilization of public opinion
has signaled to the Chinese government that hepatitis B
discrimination is palpable, destructive, and in certain instances
deadly.
A number of national laws and regulations prevent persons who
carry infectious diseases from engaging in certain lines of work.
These regulations reflect the comprehensible concern that placing an
infectious disease carrier in certain occupations might facilitate the
spread of disease. Thus, the Food Safety Law prohibits persons with
“dysentery, typhus, viral hepatitis, active pulmonary tuberculosis, or
purulent or weeping skin diseases” from “working in direct contact
with food for consumption.”203 This provision excludes a narrow
range of job possibilities for a narrowly tailored group of disease

198.
Mallee, supra note 155, at 99.
199.
Andrew Jacobs, China to End Required Testing for Hepatitis B, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2009, at A5.
200.
Tian Ying, China’s Tuberculosis Control Project Benefits Millions, XINHUA,
Feb. 21, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-02/21/c_13182
336.htm.
201.
China: Statistics, UNICEF (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.unicef.org/infoby
country/china_statistics.html.
202.
See PROMOTION LAW INTERPRETATION, supra note 31, at 82 (discussing
legal safeguards against employment discrimination against carriers of infectious
diseases).
203.
See Shipin Anquan Fa [Food Safety Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 28, 2009, effective June 1, 2009) 2009 STANDING
COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. art. 34 (viral hepatitis includes forms A, B, and C).
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carriers.
Hepatitis A, for instance, can be spread through
contaminated food or water,204 while tuberculosis can be spread
aerially when an infected person coughs, sneezes, or even speaks.205
Prohibiting carriers of these diseases from working in food production
bears a rational relationship to public safety.
Unfortunately, other regulations are less defensible.
The
Administrative Regulations on Public Hygiene, for instance, restrict
the same carriers of disease listed in the Food Safety Law from a wide
range of posts, mainly involving direct contact with customers: hotels,
restaurants, inns, cafes, bars, teahouses, public baths, barber shops,
beauty salons, movie theatres, dance halls, concert halls, gyms, public
parks, museums, libraries, and more.206 Without doing a separate
epidemiological study for each disease, it seems clear that this
regulation sweeps too broadly.
Hepatitis B provides a good example: it can be spread by birth;
sex with an infected person; sharing needles, razors, syringes, or
toothbrushes with an infected person; direct contact with blood or
open sores of an infected persons; or exposure to blood from sharp
instruments (as used in ear-piercing or tattooing).207 It seems highly
improbable that a person with the hepatitis B virus would spread the
disease if working at a movie theatre or a museum, for example,
although one can imagine a hypothetical situation where such contact
might occur. But by restricting carriers of HBV from all manner of
public employment, the regulation sends a strong symbolic message,
both to carriers and a public that is largely uninformed about the
transmission of such diseases, that carriers pose a health risk, should
not work in public places, and should avoid coming into contact with
the general public.
Similarly, the 1989 Supervisory Regulations on Hygiene in
Cosmetic Products ban some people from working directly in the
production of cosmetics.208 In addition to carriers of the diseases
listed above (viral hepatitis, tuberculosis, and dysentery), persons
with eczema, ringworm, and other dermatological conditions are also

204.
Hepatitis A Information for Health Professionals: Hepatitis A FAQs for
Health Professionals, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 9, 2009),
http://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/HAV/HAVfaq.htm. Uncooked contaminated foods have led
to outbreaks. Id.
205.
Tuberculosis: Basic TB Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(June 1, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/tb/topic/basics/default.htm.
206.
See Gonggong Changsuo Weisheng Guanli Tiaoli [Administrative
Provisions on Public Hygiene] (promulgated by the State Council, Apr. 1, 1987,
effective Apr. 1, 1987) arts. 2, 7 (listing public places and forbidden diseases).
207.
Hepatitis B Information for the Public: Hepatitis B FAQs for the Public,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 9, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/heap
titis/B/bFAQ.htm.
208.
Huazhuangpin Weisheng Jiandu Tiaoli [Supervisory Regulations on
Hygiene in Cosmetic Products] (promulgated by the State Council, Sept. 26, 1989,
effective Jan. 1, 1990) art. 7.
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prohibited.209 This prohibition may be rational for ringworm, which
can be spread through indirect contact if a second person touches an
object that has been touched by the infected person. Eczema,
however, is not contagious.210 Prohibiting persons with eczema from
working in cosmetic production serves no purpose except to
discriminate against them. By excluding people in this way, the
State Council signals that their skin problem—a superficial
blemish—renders them unfit for the work of “beautiful people.”
These restrictions entrench discrimination against carriers of
diseases, excluding capable workers from jobs based on unfounded
fears rather than genuine science.
Regulators should instead
determine the nexus between the spread of the disease (whether
through casual contact, blood, bodily fluid, etc.) and the likelihood of
contagion for a particular position. They can then specify which
diseases are particularly contagious, and which positions should be
off limits for medical reasons. Some comfort can be drawn from the
fact that these quite sweeping regulations were issued in the 1980s,
whereas more recent laws—like the 2009 Food Safety Law noted
above—significantly narrow the scope to a few forbidden posts.211
However, until these regulations are formally withdrawn, they
remain valid law in the PRC.
Moreover, because recently
promulgated laws often explicitly carve out job posts proscribed by
early regulations and directives passed decades ago,212 these
regulations continue to generate prejudice against people.
3B. Efforts to Reform Discrimination Against Infectious Disease
Carriers
Not long after the Zhang and Zhou incidents,213 various
government bodies began revising laws and regulations. In 2005, the
Ministry of Personnel issued the government’s first responsive
regulation, permitting some carriers of the hepatitis B virus to work

209.
Id.
210.
JANET ZAND ET AL., SMART MEDICINE FOR HEALTHIER LIVING 259 (1999).
211.
See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
212.
See, e.g., Jiuye Cujin Fa [Employment Promotion Law] (promulgated by
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) art. 30.
[N]o suspected carrier of any infectious pathogen the likely existence of which
has been proven by a medical examination shall be permitted to enter into any
type of employment prone to facilitate the spread of infectious diseases and
therefore forbidden by any law, administrative regulations or the Public Health
Administrative Department of the State Council before he/she is cured or
eliminates the suspicion that he/she carries the infectious pathogen in
question.
Id.
213.

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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in civil service positions.214 Applicants with “chronic or acute
hepatitis” were still barred, but “antigen carriers” who had been
examined could still work.215
In 2007, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security promulgated
two regulations that secure the employment rights of HBV carriers.
The first, Opinion on Protecting the Employment Rights of Carriers
of the Hepatitis Surface Antigen, deals exclusively with carriers.216 It
provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]part from those jobs specifically
proscribed by national laws, administrative regulations, and
regulations from the Ministry of Health due to ease of contagion,
employers may neither refuse to hire, nor fire, a carrier of the
hepatitis B antigen because he carries the antigen.”217
The
regulation “strictly regulates the employer’s request and use of
medical examinations,” permitting them only when there is “actual
need” based on the exigencies of the job.218 An employer cannot force
a job applicant to take a hepatitis B test unless HBV carriers are
prohibited from taking the job by national laws or administrative
regulations.219 The regulation also calls on medical institutions to
“protect the privacy rights of hepatitis antigen carriers,” suggesting
that they too have a responsibility to keep this delicate information in
the proper hands.220 Finally, the regulation calls on local offices of
the Labor Ministry, as well as labor arbitration committees, to protect
the legal rights and interests of laborers in general. Specifically, the
regulation calls on these actors “to prevent occurrences of the
employment discrimination issue” in hiring and employing
workers.221 This regulation represents a targeted response to the
problem of discrimination against HBV carriers. By calling on labor
arbitration committees, the regulation holds out the promise of
implementing antidiscrimination law.
Second, the Ministry of Labor of Social Security promulgated
Regulations
on
Employment
Services
and
Employment
Administration, which complement the Employment Promotion Law
in various ways,222 including prohibitions of discrimination against

214.
Gongwuyuan Luyong Tijian Tongyong Biaozhun (shixing) [General
Standards for Physical Examinations in the Employment of Civil Servants
(provisional)] (promulgated by Ministry of Personnel, Jan. 17, 2005).
215.
Id. art. 7.
216.
Guanyu Weihu Yigan Biaomian Kangyuan Xiedaizhe Jiuye Quanlide Yijian
[Opinion on Protecting the Employment Rights of Carriers of the Hepatitis Surface
Antigen] (promulgated by the Ministry of Labor & Soc. Sec., May 18, 2007).
217.
Id. art. 2(1).
218.
Id. art. 2(2).
219.
Id.
220.
Id.
221.
Id. art. 3(1).
222.
Jiuye Fuwu yu Jiuye Guanli Guiding [Regulations on Employment Services
& Employment Administration] (promulgated by the Ministry of Labor & Soc. Sec.,
Nov. 5, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) art. 1. (noting that the “regulations were
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women, disabled persons, and carriers of infectious diseases.223
Apropos of HBV, the Regulations, for the first time, prescribe a
punishment for employers that discriminate against carriers. If an
employer requires an HBV test for a job not prohibited to carriers by
national law or administrative regulation, the employer faces a fine of
up to 1,000 rmb (about $150).224
In this way, the regulation addresses a fairly common type of
indirect discrimination in China, as analyzed more fully in the
following section.
Employers may claim that the medical
examination (of which the HBV test forms a part) is a neutral policy
designed to ensure the health of all applicants, but they may instead
use the results to exclude HBV carriers. Although 1,000 rmb is a
small sum for many Chinese employers, the Regulations are helpful
in articulating a sanction, something Chinese labor law has tended to
avoid.
In February 2010, the Chinese government fully scrapped HBV
testing.225 Three ministries issued a Notice to prohibit employers and
schools from requesting HBV testing in medical examinations,
requesting the results of an applicant’s HBV tests, or asking the
applicant if he carries the antigen.226 Medical institutions are
likewise banned from giving schools or employers the results of the
medical examination.227 The Notice also recognizes the important
privacy rights that attach to this information by making it for the
examinee’s eyes only.228 Finally, the Notice includes sanctions
against employers and schools that illegally request HBV
examinations.229

formulated in accordance with the Employment Promotion Law . . . so as to improve
employment service . . . foster and perfect an openly structured human resources
market . . . and provide services for job-seekers”). As a regulation issued by the Labor
Ministry, the Regulations would be subordinate to the Employment Promotion Law if
there were a conflict in their provisions. Lifa fa [Legislation Law] (promulgated by
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000) art. 79.
223.
Regulations on Employment Services & Employment Administration, arts.
16, 18–19.
224.
Id. art. 68.
225.
Guanyu Jinyibu Guifan Ruxue he Jiuye Tijian Xiangmu Weihu Yigan
Biaomian Kangyuan Xiedaizhe Ruxue he Jiuye Quanlide Tongzhi [Notice Further
Regulating the Items on Physical Examinations for Education and Employment to
Protect the Educational and Employment Rights of Hepatitis B Surface Antigen
Carriers] (promulgated by the Ministries of Educ., Health, and Labor & Soc. Sec., Feb.
10, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Notice].
226.
Id. art. 1.
227.
Id.
228.
Id. art. 2 (“The hepatitis B items on the examination report should be
sealed, only to be opened by the examinee. No employer or individual may open
another person’s examination report.”).
229.
See id. art. 3 (“If employers violate this Notice, and request an applicant sit
for an HBV examination, they should timely terminate the request, correct the
mistake, and be punished according to the Regulations on Employment Services and
Employment Administration.”).
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IV. THE HBV SOCIAL MOVEMENT
In 2003, the cases of Zhou Yichao and Zhang Xianzhu first raised
the profile of HBV discrimination. Zhou’s criminal trial and Zhang’s
administrative trial received national and international attention.230
The trials informed government officials, among others, that
employment discrimination against HBV carriers required a rapid
response. But the cases also set in motion a wider chain of events—a
social movement that has clamored for legal reform.
Before
examining the various activities and channels by which HBV
advocates have fomented legal change, this Part provides a
rudimentary primer to illuminate the basic concepts of social
movements.
Sociologists attend to three facets of social movements to explain
their emergence, evolution, and success (or failure).231 First, scholars
direct attention to the particular group’s political opportunities and
constraints, including changes in institutional structures or informal
power relations.232 This analysis may also include the openness of
the political system, the stability of elites that support the system,
and the state’s capacity for repression.233 In other words, one must
appreciate the broader political context and the internal dynamics
that permit a movement to gain traction in a particular society.
Second, and inseparable from the issue of context, scholars
consider the “mobilizing structures” of a movement: the collective
vehicles, networks, and organizations through which people advocate
for change.234 For a movement to survive and achieve success,
however defined, activists must create organizational structures to
sustain collective action.235 The individual accomplishments of
people like Martin Luther King, Jr. and Susan B. Anthony are
impressive, but neither would likely have succeeded without an
organization of supporters, such as the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference or the National Women’s Rights Convention.
The context of rights-promotion for HBV carriers in China is, of
course, vastly different from late nineteenth-century New England or
mid-twentieth-century Georgia, but the importance of organizational

230.
231.

See supra note 1.
Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Introduction to
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES,
MOBILIZING STRUCTURES & CULTURAL FRAMINGS 1, 2 (Doug McAdam et al. eds., 1996)
[hereinafter COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES].
232.
Id. at 2–3.
233.
Id. at 12.
234.
Id. at 2.
235.
Id. at 13.
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structures in sustaining collective action runs throughout most social
movements.236
Third, a proper analysis must account for “framing processes,”
the shared meanings through which advocates and affected people
understand their situation.237 Social movements are predicated upon
the tension between shared anxieties about a particular problem and
optimism that collective action can redress it.238 The framing process
asks: What stories do they tell to explain their particular conditions?
How do they interpret events to fit within these dominant
narratives?239
To sum up, any analysis of social movements needs to account
for the sociopolitical context in which a movement emerges, the
organizational networks that foster the desired change, and the
signification processes through which agents perceive the problem
and the solutions. There is room, of course, to quibble with the lines
between these categories,240 but they seem to constitute three vital
acts of any social movement.
As noted, 2003 was “the year of antidiscrimination” for HBV
carriers.241 Within months of each other, the Zhou and Zhang cases
showed how serious and widespread discrimination was; moreover,
they showed that the government itself was an agent of
discrimination. The incidents provided a useful political opportunity
around which antidiscrimination advocates could raise awareness of
the
problem
of
employment
discrimination,
particularly
discrimination against carriers of HBV.
Two ambitious and
accomplished young men sought to join government service, the
highest calling for aspiring youth in traditional China from the Tang
Dynasty to the present.242 Both passed the “substantive” portions of
the challenging civil service examination, yet another proud tradition
that ensures that only the most qualified enter government
service.243 Yet both were denied positions due to a factor that they

236.
Id. (“For the movement to survive, [social activists] must be able to create a
more enduring organizational structure to sustain collective action. Efforts to do so
usually entail the creation of the kinds of formal social movement organizations
(SMOs) stressed as important by resource-mobilization theorists.”).
237.
Id. at 2.
238.
Id. at 5.
239.
Id.
240.
Anthony Oberschall, Opportunities and Framing in the Eastern European
Revolts of 1989, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 231, at 93, 93. Oberschall
divides the social movement into four components: discontents and grievances, ideas to
frame the important issues, collective action, and political opportunity. Id. at 94.
241.
See, e.g., Cheng Gong, Fan Yigan Qishi Lu Manman [The Road Against
Hepatitis B Discrimination Is Long], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND], Oct. 27, 2005,
http://www.southcn.com/weekend/commend/200510270009.htm.
242.
See IMMANUEL C.Y. HSÜ, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 75–78 (6th ed. 2000)
(describing the civil service examinations in Imperial China and their role in
establishing social status).
243.
Id.
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could not control, a factor that would imperil neither their ability to
work nor the health of their colleagues.244
In recent years, high-profile cases such as Zhou’s and Zhang’s
have catalyzed legal reform efforts, or at the very least symbolized
larger problems that litigation aims to address.245 The criminal trial
of Zhou Yichao and his subsequent execution may not have aroused
much public sympathy, but the affair surely captured the attention of
the government. In contrast, Zhang’s decision to channel his
disappointment through administrative litigation served more than
his own ends, coupled with extensive media coverage, ensured that
hundreds of millions of people in and outside of China.246 The court’s
highly technical decision did not vindicate Zhang,247 but it did spark
a debate about the human rights of one of China’s largest
disadvantaged groups and the function of courts in protecting those
rights. At the time, Chinese courts manifested little sympathy for
plaintiffs suing for discrimination and generally avoided ascribing
any kind of culpability to government actors.248 However routine the
filing of an employment discrimination action may seem to American
readers, Zhang’s decision to litigate was by no means automatic. His
parents firmly opposed the decision to sue.249 At that time, very few

244.
See Ching-Ching Ni, supra note 1, at A5 (noting that hepatitis B cannot be
contracted without the exchange of bodily fluids).
245.
The linking of cases or incidents to subsequent legal reform is a ripe topic
for study. Important case studies would include the Yang Jia case (mental health of
criminal defendants), the She Xianglin cases (sentencing and proof), the Deng Yujiao
case (murder of government official by woman he tried to rape), or any of the recent
murders in detention centers. See infra Appendix.
246.
In contrast, Zhang's decision to channel his disappointment through
administrative litigation served more than his own ends; through extensive outreach to
the media, HBV advocates ensure that hundreds of millions of people in and outside of
China could learn about Zhang's case. See Zhou Wei & Li Cheng, Xianfa Pingdeng,
Ziyou yu Fanqishide Gongyi Susong—Anli, Guocheng yu Pinglun [Public Interest
Litigation in Constitutional Equality, Liberty & Antidiscrimination—Cases, Processes
& Criticisms] 76 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (listing
numerous Chinese articles about the lawsuit and subsequent hearings).
247.
The court merely found that the hospital that administered the medical
examination wrongly concluded that Zhang was unfit to work at the Personnel Bureau.
Accordingly, the Bureau’s adoption of the hospital’s conclusion lacked a factual basis.
But the court did not order compensation for Zhang or order the Personnel Bureau to
hire him. ZHOU WEI, ZHONGGUODE LAODONG JIUYE QISHI: FALÜ YU XIANSHI
[EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN CHINA: LEGISLATION & REALITY] 348, 355–56 (2006).
248.
One much discussed case involved Jiang Tao, who sued the Chengdu
branch of the People’s Bank of China in early 2002. In job advertisements, the Bank
required male applicants to be 168 centimeters (5’7”), but Jiang stood 165 centimeters
(5’6”). With the help of his professor, Zhou Wei, Jiang sued the Bank, which then
removed the height requirement from the advertisement. The removal mooted the case.
As far as the court was concerned, “Plaintiff Jiang Tao’s claimed rights infringement
has not yet occurred, and is hence not litigable.” Zhou Wei & Li Cheng, supra note 246,
at 28.
249.
Id. at 78.
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people had sued for employment discrimination, and those who did
had little to show for it.250
In September 2003, Zhang’s name appeared on gandan
xiangzhao, an online discussion board for HBV carriers.251 The site’s
webmaster and various posters encouraged Zhang to take legal action
to protect his rights.252 The site also served to connect Zhang with
Professor Zhou Wei of Sichuan University in Chengdu.253 In 2002,
Professor Zhou made headlines by litigating one of China’s first
employment
discrimination
cases,
which
involved
height
discrimination.254 He wanted to expand his work in the field of
constitutional litigation, ever hoping to “marry theory and
He heard about Zhang’s case through gandan
practice.”255
xiangzhao, and he instructed a student to contact Zhang through the
website.256 Professor Zhou wanted “to fight for the basic survival
rights of 120 million HBV carriers” and to “protect the basic rights of
humanity.”257 Even at this early stage, the issue of employment
discrimination was framed as a basic human right to survival.258

250.

The plaintiffs whose cases appear in this book sued on the
understanding that their personal rights had been violated . . . . At the
time they filed, most knew that the majority of lawsuits had been
unsuccessful up until that time, but they nevertheless chose to litigate
in order to balance individual rights and interests, transmit legal
knowledge, and support the public interest.

Id. at ii.
251.
Zhou Mu, “Yigan Qishi” An Kaiting: Zhou Wei Lüshi Jieshou Jizhe
Zhuanfang [“Hepatitis B Discrimination” Case Opens: Lawyer Zhou Wei Accepts
Exclusive Interview], CHENGDU WANBAO, Dec. 12, 2003, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003
-12-20/03432419602.shtml. Meaning, literally, “the liver and gall bladder illuminate
each other,” but more figuratively, devotion or sincerity between two people, gandan
xiangzhao was one of the first fora where Chinese HBV carriers could openly and
anonymously discuss their problems. Id.
252.
Id.
253.
Id.
254.
See Zhou Wei & Li Cheng, supra note 246, at 23.
255.
Id. at 1.
256.
See Zhou Mu, supra note 251.
257.
Id.
258.
In this way, HBV advocates share similarities with rural rights resisters as
theorized by O’Brien and Li, who define rightful resistance as a “popular form of
contention that operates near the boundary of authorized channels, employs the
rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb the exercise of power, hinges on
locating and exploiting divisions within the state, and relies on mobilizing support from
the wider public.” KEVIN J. O’BRIEN & LIANJIANG LI, RIGHTFUL RESISTANCE IN RURAL
CHINA 2 (2005). HBV advocates use the language of the state—constitutional law,
national law, regulations, and so on—to frame their struggle, such as the right to
survival. But they are quite keen on using authorized channels to effectuate legal
change, as seen in the numerous petitions they have submitted to the National People’s
Congress. They are also less concerned about exploiting the central-rural divide. For
the most part, HBV advocates are comparatively wealthy, well educated, and more
Internet-savvy than rural resisters. Moreover, rightful resisters occasionally agitate
quite demonstrably (i.e., tearing up ballots, grabbing microphones to denounce local
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With Professor Zhou as his advocate, Zhang Xianzhu sued the
Wuhu Personnel Bureau in November 2003.259 At the time, there
was no law on point, so Professor Zhou fashioned a number of
innovative corollaries to press the case. For instance, Zhang’s
complaint alleged that the Bureau’s conclusion not to hire him
because of HBV constituted “malicious discrimination” and “did not
fulfill the state’s legal obligations to respect and protect human
rights, and to treat citizens equally under the law.”260 It was, in
other words, a violation of the right to equality enshrined in Article
33(2) of the Chinese Constitution.261 In subsequent filings, Professor
Zhou noted that Chinese laws—such as the Law on the Prevention of
Infectious Diseases and the Food Safety Law—and regulations—such
as the Public Safety Hygiene Regulations A—bar HBV carriers from
employment in potentially high-risk positions like medical facilities
and food production plants.262 He argued that these concerns were
inapposite to an office job in a personnel bureau.263
The court found the hospital—not a party to the lawsuit—had
erred in concluding Zhang was unfit for the position.264 Anhui
Province’s Provisional Implementing Regulations for the Physical
Examination of National Civil Servants disqualified actively infected
carriers of HBV, but it did not disqualify passive carriers like
Zhang.265 Moreover, the hospital exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling
on Zhang’s suitability; jurisdiction properly belonged to the Personnel
Bureau.266 Ultimately, the court found that it could order no remedy
because the recruitment cycle ended with the second-placed candidate
filling the post.267 Zhang won a symbolic victory on a very minute

officials), and repose trust in the central government at the expense of local officials.
Id. at 56–57. HBV advocates may demonstrate publicly, but not in a confrontational
way, and there is not an implicit trust in the central government over local
governments. Id. at 42–43.
259.
ZHOU WEI, supra note 247, at 326.
260.
Id. at 327.
261.
Id.
262.
For instance, the Food Safety Law, Law on Prevention of Infectious
Diseases, Administrative Provisions on Public Hygiene, and Implementing Regulations
for the Administrative Provisions on Public Hygiene all place various restrictions on
HBV carriers in fields such as food production, water provision, child care, and even
beauty salons. Id. at 329, 333. But the position Zhang applied for involved economic
administration in the county affairs office, and was unlikely to involve the kind of
direct human contact that would conceivably make an HBV carrier “undesirable.” Id.
at 333.
263.
Id. at 355.
264.
Id.
265.
Id. at 333.
266.
Id. at 355.
267.
Id.
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point of law, and his case made headlines all over China,268 but he
left the courthouse as unemployed as when he entered it.269
Zhang’s lawsuit was itself an event, providing an opportunity to
call attention to the larger issue of discrimination against HBV
carriers. Advocates informed the media about Zhang’s case, ensuring
that dozens of journalists attended the hearings and reported on the
announcement of the verdict.270 Members of the online support group
gandan xiangzhao also attended the hearings, both to show support
for Zhang and to increase visibility for their cause. Press reports
about a figure as sympathetic as Zhang opened up discussions and
allayed people’s fears about working alongside HBV carriers.271
The gandan xiangzhao website quickly gained a large following
among HBV carriers and others.272 An international domain name
since 2001, the site had attracted 85,000 registered members by
December 2004,273 and it served as a sounding board for the
frustration of carriers and their experiences in education,
employment, housing, public services, and other fields. The ability to
communicate openly, freely, and honestly about this topic brought
together a large community of HBV advocates who had neither
discussed the issue publicly nor publicly identified themselves as a
group in need of legal protection.
The website also functioned as a collective action center. On
August 13, 2003, advocates posted a proposal on the site, asking the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (the highest
legislative body of China) to review the constitutionality of the

268.
See Zhou Wei & Li Cheng, supra note 246, at 76 (listing the newspaper
articles covering the case, from such sources as People’s Daily, Xinhua, CCTV,
Southern Weekend, and others).
269.
Zhang has not had an easy time finding work. He was let go from a job in a
Guangzhou factory after his boss recognized him from the lawsuit. He also taught at an
elementary school in Guizhou. He has received offers from hospitals and
pharmaceutical companies to serve as a spokesperson, but he worried that such
positions would “be equal to selling my own soul.” See generally Huang Maowang,
Zhang Xianzhu: Yigan Zhidu Qishi Yin Ta Zhibu [Zhang Xianzhu: Systemic
Discrimination Against Hepatitis B Stopped Because of Him], FAZHI ZHOUBAO [LEGAL
WEEKLY], Aug. 29, 2008, http://www.dffy.com/sifashijian/jj/200808/200808291518
38.htm.
270.
See Zhou Wei & Li Cheng, supra note 246, at 78–79 (noting that fifty
journalists attended the December 19, 2003, hearing and over thirty journalists, from
all over the country, attended the verdict on April 2, 2004).
271.
See, e.g., Du Wenjuan, Chuanranbing Fangzhifa: Zhang Xianzhu wei 1.2
Yiren Weiquan [Ways of Curing Infectious Diseases: Zhang Xianzhu Protects the Rights
of 120 Million], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Apr. 13, 2005, http://www.china
law.gov.cn/article/xwzx/fzxw/200504/20050400064939.shtml.
272.
Some of the plaintiffs analyzed in Part V of this Article also used the
gandan site for legal and moral support. Plaintiffs 3 and 21, among others, used the
site. See infra Appendix.
273.
See “In the Hepatitis B Camp” Website: Home of Hepatitis B Carriers in
China, HEPATITIS B CARRIERS BBS, http://www.hbvhbv.com/english (last visited Apr. 9,
2011).
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provincial regulations on civil servant examinations.274 Over 1,600
Chinese citizens signed the petition before sending it to the Standing
Committee in November 2003.275 The petition warned of “dozens,
even hundreds, of Zhou Yichaos” if the government did not attend to
Invoking domestic laws and
this “serious social problem.”276
international human rights law,277 the petition urged “the Chinese
State and Central People’s Government to honor their solemn
commitment to the people of the world, and ensure the collective right
to exist of 120 million people. If we improve the living conditions of
120 million people, this would be China’s contribution to all of
humanity.”278
The petition contained a number of proposals, some of which
have since been adopted. First and foremost, the petition called on
the State Council to remove HBV from the list of disqualifying
diseases on the civil service examinations,279 a task realized
gradually by regulations issued in 2007 and 2010.280 Another
proposal suggested the protection of privacy rights for HBV
carriers;281 this proposal subsequently materialized in the 2010
Notice discussed above.282 Perhaps most importantly, this petition
served as a template for subsequent requests made to government
bodies. Lu Jun, one of China’s leading HBV advocates, has called on
government bodies to pass various types of protective legislation and
regulation.283 HBV advocates continue to petition the National

274.
See Zhanyou Daqianming Faqi “Weixian Shenchashu” [Droves of Netizens
Sign “Review of Constitutionality”], XINLANG DUSHU [NEW WAVE READER], Jan. 24,
2005, http://book.sina.com.cn/longbook/ele/1106534107_zhanshengyigan/54.shtml.
275.
A copy of the petition appears on the gandan xiangzhao website. 1611 wei
Gongming Yaoqiu dui Zhongguo 31 sheng Gonwuyuan Luyong Xianzhi Yigan
Xiedaizhe Guiding Jinxing Weixian Shengcha he Jiaqiang Yigan Xiedaixhe Lifa
Baohude Jianyishu [A Petition by 1,611 Citizens to Demand Review of the
Constitutionality of China’s 31 Provinces’ Regulations Limiting the Hire of Civil
Servants with the Hepatitis B Virus, and to Strengthen the Legal Protection of Hepatitis
B Virus Carriers], HEPATITIS B CARRIERS BBS (Nov. 20, 2003, 2:13 PM),
http://www.hbvhbv.com/forum/thread-298433-1-963.html [hereinafter Petition].
276.
See id. art. II(8) (referring to the example of Zhou Yichao).
277.
For instance, the Petition cites Article 33 of the Chinese Constitution
(equal protection clause), and the first and second chapters of the Labor Law, which
guarantee inter alia equal employment. Id.
278.
Id. art. II(11) (emphasis added).
279.
Id. art. III(1).
280.
See supra Part III.3.B.
281.
Petition, supra note 275, art. III(3).
282.
See 2010 Notice, supra note 225, art. II.
283.
See Zhao Xiaoqiu, Tamende Fanyigan Qishizhi Zhan [Their Battle Against
Hepatitis B Discrimination], FALÜ YU SHENGHUO (Apr. 27, 2010), http://focus.news.16
3.com/10/0427/18/659VUC2900011SM9.html (noting that nine HBV websites
collectively drafted a petition to protect the employment, education, and privacy rights
of HBV carriers, which prominent advocate Lu Jun personally delivered to the State
Council in September 2004, and that Lu Jun delivered similar petitions during the
annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Political Consultative
Committee in 2005, 2006, and 2007).
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People’s Congress, the Supreme People’s Court, and various
ministries to enhance the protections of HBV carriers and
disadvantaged people more generally.284
Upon the success of the gandan xiangzhao website, advocates
established other websites and organizations to agitate on behalf of
HBV carriers. For instance, hbver.com includes a message board,
news articles about HBV, information about cirrhosis of the liver, and
links to medicines and prevention methods.285
Another site,
ganbaobao.com, contains a special section on rights protection, with
articles on the prevalence of discrimination, news about various
lawsuits, and advice on how to handle rights infringements.286
Another legally oriented site is fanqishi.com, which links to articles
on laws and lawsuits involving various forms of discrimination.287
These sites continue to play the role of informant and sounding board
for HBV carriers, allowing people from all over China (and the world)
to participate in the discussion. In addition, specialized organizations
have sprung up to raise awareness, educate citizens, litigate cases,
and petition government bodies to enhance protections. The most
successful of these organizations is probably Yirenping, which
litigates cases, surveys employer attitudes, publishes a bimonthly
newsletter with recent developments, and submits petitions to
government bodies on behalf of HBV carriers.288
In society more generally, for the first time, a wider discussion of
discrimination took place online, both on hepatitis B websites and on
state-run news agencies such as CCTV. They debated public safety

284.
See Guanyu “Jiuye Cujin Fa” Bufen Tiaokuan Jinxing Sifa Jieshide Jianyi
[Proposal to Create a Judicial Interpretation for Some Provisions in the “Employment
Promotion Law”] (on file with author) (proposing to have district courts consider
hearing employment discrimination cases, distinguish employment discrimination
cases from labor dispute cases, and order defendants to pay for emotional pain and
suffering damages when necessary). The petition was sent to the Supreme People’s
Court in early 2010. See Waidi Canjiren ye Xiang Guangzhoushi Gongjiao Youhui
[Non-resident Disabled People Also Enjoy Transportation Benefits from Guangzhou
City], YANGCHENG WANBAO, May 16, 2010, http://www.ycwb.com/ePaper/ycwb/html/
2010-05/16/content_829080.htm (noting that 171 disabled people from twenty-five
provinces signed a petition to the Guangzhou Transportation Commission requesting
preferential services on Guangzhou public transit).
285.
See
Zhansheng
Yigan
[Fighting
for
Victory],
HBVER.COM,
http://www.hbver.com/Index.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2011) (providing comprehensive
information for hepatitis B patients including new medical discovery, news, and
discrimination against hepatitis B carriers).
286.
See Ganbaobao [Precious Liver], GANBAOBAO.COM.CN, http://www.ganbao
bao.com.cn (last visited Apr. 9, 2011). The section on “rights protection by friends of the
liver” (ganyou weiquan) appears in the lower right hand section of the front page.
287.
See generally Anti-Discrimination Laws, FANQISHI.COM, http://www.fanq
ishi.com (last visited Apr. 9, 2011) (containing hepatitis B discrimination news, cases,
and statutes against employment discrimination from both China and abroad).
288.
See generally Beijing Yi Ren Ping Center, YI REN PING, http://www.yiren
ping.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2011) (linking to relevant laws and regulations as well as
reporting Yirenping’s litigation efforts).
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concerns, legal issues such as the rights to equal employment and
privacy, and other matters related to hepatitis B.289 HBV came out of
the closet and onto the tongues and screens of millions of Chinese.
Significant media attention helped the mobilizing structures keep the
issue on the public radar.
Finally, there is the issue of signification processes.290 How do
HBV advocates understand their struggle?
What language or
discourse do they use to frame the debate between carriers and the
employers who seek to avoid them? As a socialist country with a long
history of state-sponsored employment, China privileges social and
economic rights (such as food, education, social welfare, and
employment) over civil and political ones.291 In complaints to courts
of law, signs brandished during demonstrations, and interviews with
journalists and others, the issue is framed in socioeconomic terms.
For example, advocates carry signs that state “Eliminate Hepatitis B
Discrimination—Construct a Harmonious Society,” or “Eliminate
Hepatitis B Discrimination—Promote Equal Employment,” or even
“It Is Not Easy to Deprive 120 Million HBV Antigen Carriers of the
Right to Survive.”292 By framing the issue in terms used by the
government—such as “harmonious society”—the movement aligns
itself with government interests and avoids appearing confrontational
or oppositional. Instead, they present their cause as one of necessity,
equality, and the right to a job. No one is asking for charity or a
politically sensitive privilege such as the right to vote. Instead,
advocates insist that HBV carriers simply want to work, to contribute
to society, and to live. No official could cavil about such a platform of
demands.293
By raising public awareness, petitioning for legal reform, and
mobilizing media support for their cause, activists have made HBV
discrimination one of China’s leading equality issues. Their actions
have helped create a legal foundation from which they can assert
rights and perhaps change employer behavior. The success of their
assertion of rights is taken up in the final section.

289.
See, e.g., Xiaochu Yigan Qishi [Eliminating Hepatitis Discrimination],
CCTV (Feb. 18, 2004), http://www.cctv.com/program/jkzlzmb/20040218/100084.shtml
(transcribing an interview between a CCTV reporter and Tsinghua University’s Yang
Suiyan).
290.
See McAdam et al., supra note 231, at 16–17.
291.
ROBERT WEATHERLEY, THE DISCOURSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA 24–25
(1999).
292.
During demonstrations, activists have carried banners with these and
other slogans. Jiang Yongping, supra note 80.
293.
Women’s rights advocates, by contrast, have framed the discussion in terms
of international human rights law. See generally de Silva de Alwis, supra note 137, at
207 (noting China’s obligations under international human rights conventions).
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V. EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION LAW
The Employment Promotion Law of 2007 would have helped
HBV carriers like Zhang Xianzhu and Zhou Yichao.294 Drafting
began in late 2003,295 perhaps spurred by the public outcry
surrounding Zhang and Zhou. Initially, however, the drafters were
mainly focused on irregularities in China’s labor market, which they
sought to rectify through training programs, regulation of
employment agencies, and boosting investment in employment
services.296 There was particular concern about the oversaturation of
labor in industries like manufacturing, as well as the lack of technical
expertise in other industries, such as high-tech fields.297
Although these issues were the primary concerns of the National
People’s Congress (NPC), public comment on an early draft brought to
light a topic not then on the agenda. The NPC’s General Office of
Standing Committee posted a draft of the Employment Promotion
Law (EPL) on its website from March 25 to April 25, 2007, during
which time the general public submitted over 11,000 opinions, 7,000
People
of which concerned discrimination in employment.298
recounted their personal experiences with discrimination in many
forms,
including
sex,
age,
appearance,
and
disability
Public opposition to discrimination against
discrimination.299
Based on this
hepatitis B carriers was particularly acute.300
response, the NPC’s Legal Affairs Commission introduced an entirely
new chapter into the law: Chapter 3, “Equal Employment,”
systematized the smattering of protections interspersed throughout
the earlier draft and expanded protections to five groups of
disadvantaged people.301

294.
See Jiuye Cujin Fa [Employment Promotion Law] (promulgated by
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) art. 30
(covering infectious disease carriers). But Jiang Tao would not have been covered, since
the law does not cover height discrimination.
295.
China Hopes to Promote Justice in Employment by New Law, CHINA DEV.
GATEWAY (Mar. 11, 2007), http://www.chinagate.cn/english/social/50373.htm.
296.
Id.
297.
Tian Chengping, Guanyu “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiuye Cujin Fa
(Caoan)” de Shuoming [Explanation of the PRC Employment Promotion Law (Draft)],
in PROMOTION LAW INTERPRETATION, supra note 31, at 219, 220.
298.
Liu Bohong, Jiang Xingbie Pingdeng Naru Lifa Guocheng [Incorporating
Gender Equality into the Process of Making Legislation], in NEW AND EMERGING
DEVELOPMENTS IN GENDER AND LAW IN CHINA: COMPILATION OF PAPERS AND
PRESENTATIONS AT THE CHINA GENDER AND LAW EXPERTS CONSULTATION 75, 87
(Wellesley Ctrs. for Women ed., 2010) [hereinafter EMERGING DEVELOPMENTS].
299.
See PROMOTION LAW INTERPRETATION, supra note 31, at 65.
300.
Id. at 81.
301.
Jiuye Cujin Fa [Employment Promotion Law] (promulgated by Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) arts. 25–31
(containing provisions on gender, ethnicity, the handicapped, carriers of infectious
diseases, and rural workers in urban areas); Quanguo Renda Falü Weiyuanhui Guanyu
“Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiuye Cujin Fa (Caoan)” Xiugai Qingkuangde Huibao
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This process marked an important innovation in the drafting of
Chinese law. Since 2005, the NPC has posted draft laws on the
Internet to solicit feedback from concerned citizens and interest
groups.302 The experience with the EPL shows that public opinion—
when directed at the right target and conveyed through the proper
channels—can have an enormous impact on the final form that the
law takes.
Since entering into effect on January 1, 2008, the EPL has
generated a large number of lawsuits challenging a few types of
employment discrimination. Unlike previous guarantees of equality
in employment, found in such laws as the Labor Law or Women’s
Law, the EPL grants access to People’s Courts, an invitation that
The following
many discrimination victims have taken up.303
subparts discuss the relevant provisions, several representative
lawsuits, and a number of suggestions for improving the
implementation of the EPL.
A. Provisions
The third chapter of the EPL guarantees equal employment,
providing the most robust set of protections against employment
discrimination in Chinese law.304
By granting victims of
discrimination access to courts, the EPL overcomes the common
critique that Chinese labor law exists solely on paper and rarely leads
to meaningful implementation.305

[Report of the NPC Law Committee on the Situation of Revising the “PRC Employment
Promotion Law (Draft)”], in PROMOTION LAW INTERPRETATION, supra note 31, at 226—
27. An earlier version of the law included age as another prohibited category, but this
was apparently excised in subsequent decisions. See Jiuye Cujin Fa Caoan: Jianli
Pingdeng Jiuye Jinzhi Xingbie Qishi [Employment Promotion Law Draft: Establishing
Equal Employment, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination], CHINA NEWS, Feb. 26, 2007,
available at http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200702/26/235907.shtml.
302.
See NPC Invites Public’s Comments on Draft Employment Law, CHINA
DAILY, Mar. 27, 2007 (noting that the NPC publicized the draft Property Law in 2005
and the draft Labor Contract Law in 2006).
303.
Jiuye Cujin Fa [Employment Promotion Law] (promulgated by Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) art. 62.
304.
Chapter III of the Employment Promotion Law is entitled Equal
Employment (gongping jiuye). Articles 25–31 provide a wide array of protections, many
of which are described below. By comparison, Article 12 of the Labor Law protected
against discrimination in employment due to “nationality, race, sex or religious belief.”
Laodong Fa [Labor Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) art. 12. The Labor Law did not protect migrant
workers or the disabled to the extent of the Employment Promotion Law. Moreover,
without the access to courts granted by Article 62 of the Employment Promotion Law,
the Labor Law made it difficult for victims of employment discrimination to
operationalize the protections of the Labor Law.
305.
See, e.g., Ronald C. Brown, China’s Employment Discrimination Laws
During Economic Transition, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 361, 426 (2006).

2011]

Employment Discrimination in China

693

The EPL contains a general proscription of employment
discrimination, mirroring language found in the Labor Law and
Labor Contract Law.306 More importantly, it provides specific
prohibitions for five disadvantaged groups: women, ethnic minorities,
disabled persons, people with infectious diseases, and rural
workers.307 Unlike U.S. federal law308 or China’s Labor Law,309
which simply list bases on which it is illegal to discriminate, the EPL
grants different levels of protection to each group.310 This structure
allows the EPL to adapt to the existing legal framework and to
address problems unique to each group.
Three provisions in particular—on women, infectious disease
carriers, and rural residents—are germane to the present discussion.
Article 27 provides:
The state ensures that women have labor rights equal to those of men.
When an employer hires personnel, it may not refuse to employ a
woman on the basis of her sex, except for jobs or positions that the state
has specified as being unsuitable to women, or set standards for the
employment of women that are higher than those for men.

When an employer hires a female, it may not include provisions in
her employment contract that place restrictions on her getting
married, having children, etc.311
Although this provision appears to provide robust protections for
women, scholars have criticized the Employment Promotion Law for
including the exception for jobs deemed “unsuitable to women.”312
This exception may encourage employers to classify jobs as
“unsuitable” for women based on stereotyped or outdated notions of
women’s capacities, further segregating the workforce and possibly
pushing women into low-paying jobs.313

It has been said by some employers in China that labor laws are irrelevant due
to the unlikely prospect that employees will complain to the authorities or that
the laws will be enforced. Further, there is little evidence to suggest that either
the promise of remedies or the threat of penalties enhance enforcement.
Id.
306.
Article 4 echoes Article 12 of the Labor Law, by providing that individuals
“shall have the right to equal employment and to select their own jobs in accordance
with the law. The employment of workers shall not be subject to discrimination on the
basis of such factors as ethnicity, race, sex, religion, etc.” Employment Promotion Law
art. 4.
307.
Id. arts. 27–31.
308.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribed discrimination on an “individual’s
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2006).
309.
See Labor Law art. 12 (listing prohibited bases of discrimination).
310.
Employment Promotion Law arts. 27–31.
311.
Id. art. 27.
312.
Guo Huimin, Gender-Based Employment Discrimination, in EMERGING
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 298, at 90, 95.
313.
Id.
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An additional concern involves the use of the word “hire” in
section 2 (zhaoyong) and “employ” (luyong) in section 3.314 Women
face discrimination in various phases and aspects of their jobs, from
hiring to retirement, promotion, pregnancy leave, wages, and sexual
harassment. By using the word “hire,” the law limits its scope to the
period before the woman becomes an employee. Although the word
“employ” in paragraph 3 would seem to dispense with this concern,
that paragraph only covers terms that appear in the “employment
contract.”315 An employer is unlikely to indicate that he will sexually
harass a female employee in the terms of the employment contract.
In short, the law does not protect women in promotion, training,
titles, termination, and other phases of employment, as similar laws
do in Japan316 and the United States.317
The Employment Promotion Law also safeguards the rights of
carriers of infectious disease. Article 30 provides:
When hiring personnel, an employer may not refuse to employ someone
on the grounds that he or she is a carrier of an infectious disease.
However, a certified carrier of an infectious disease may not, until he or
she has recovered, or the suspicion of infectiousness has been
eliminated, engage in work prohibited by laws, administrative statutes
or the State Council’s health authority, due to the fact that it would
facilitate the spread of the disease.318

Again, one could argue that the specification of prohibited jobs may
reinforce the notion that disease carriers should be excluded from the
workplace. However, by requiring employers to base their judgments
on a certification that the person carries a disease, the role of
suspicion and misinformation, which occasionally trump sound
medical reasoning, will be minimized.319 As we shall see in Part V.B,
this is the most actively litigated provision of the EPL.

314.
Employment Promotion Law art. 27.
315.
Id.
316.
See Megan L. Starich, Comment, The 2006 Revisions to Japan’s Equal
Employment Opportunity Law: A Narrow Approach to a Pervasive Problem, 16 PAC.
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 551, 562 (2007) (discussing improvements in Japanese gender
discrimination law).
317.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covers hiring, promotion, discharge,
pay, fringe benefits, job training, classification, and other aspects of employment. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
318.
Employment Promotion Law art. 30.
319.
Even in mid-2010, after the passage of the Employment Promotion Law
and regulations banning the use of HBV tests in hiring, HBV carriers worry that
employers are uninformed about the law. See generally Jiang Dahong, Yigan Qishi Hai
Meiyou Tingzhi: Chao Liuchengde Ruzhi Tijian Hai Zai Jiancha [Discrimination
Against Hepatitis B Still Has Not Stopped: Over Sixty Percent of Medical Examinations
Still Test for It], RENMIN WANG [PEOPLE’S WEB] (Mar. 24, 2010), http://health.peo
ple.com.cn/GB/11212873.html (noting that one month after the issuance of the Notice
on HBV Examinations, less than one-half of government departments interviewed had
implemented the Notice, and less than 20 percent had received the Notice itself).
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Finally, the EPL protects the rights of migrant workers320 by
providing that “Rural workers employed in cities shall enjoy labor
rights equal to those of urban workers.
No discriminatory
restrictions may be set against rural workers seeking employment in
cities.”321 While this provision addresses a key problem discussed
above—the plethora of discriminatory restrictions that cities have
imposed against migrant workers322—it is not clear how the law
should be implemented. First, and unlike the above provisions on
women and carriers of infectious diseases, this article says neither
that “the state ensures that rural workers have labor rights equal to
those of urban workers” (as it does for women in Article 27), nor that
“the state safeguards the labor rights of rural workers” (as it does for
the disabled in Article 29).323 It thus arguably offers a lower level of
protection to rural residents than it does to women and carriers of
infectious diseases.
Second, if a migrant worker were to bring a lawsuit based, for
instance, on a city regulation that favors hiring local residents,
against whom would he file the case? The employer who did not hire
him could simply point to the municipal agency that promulgated the
discriminatory regulation. But the agency did not cause the harm—
the employer refused to hire the plaintiff. Just as in the Zhang
Xianzhu case, a court could find that the municipal agency exceeded
its jurisdictional limits or the agency’s actions lacked a factual basis,
then deem itself powerless to devise a remedy.324 Moreover, a court
cannot annul a regulation passed by an administrative agency.325 Of
course, until a migrant worker brings a lawsuit challenging
discrimination under the EPL, we will have to wait to see how a court
enforces this provision.
B. Cases
The twenty-five lawsuits found and analyzed by this author took
place all over China, in Beijing, Shanghai, Xinjiang, Guangxi,

320.
Article 20 also calls on the state “to guide the orderly transition of surplus
agricultural labor” to urban areas, and on local people’s governments “in both laborexporting and labor-importing areas to improve the environment and conditions for
cities that employ rural laborers.” Employment Promotion Law art. 20.
321.
Id. art. 31.
322.
See supra notes 163–71 and accompanying text.
323.
Employment Promotion Law arts. 27, 29.
324.
See ZHOU WEI, supra note 247, at 355–56. The court found that the agency
lacked factual basis for its actions, but also found the issue moot as the position has
already been filled. Id.
325.
Chinese courts cannot review abstract administrative acts, such as when an
administrative body passes regulations or orders, but they can review concrete
administrative acts, such as when an administrative body or its personnel exercises
administrative authority that targets a specific citizen or legal person. Lin Feng,
Administrative Law, in INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW, supra note 197, at 75, 76.

696

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

[Vol. 44:643

Zhengzhou, Shenzhen, and many other places.326 The widespread
use of lawsuits suggests that plaintiffs trust courts to entrust them
with the adjudication of cases involving basic human rights.327 The
overwhelming majority of suits—twenty-two of twenty-five—came
from HBV carriers, a fact that signals both the strength and the
limitations of the EPL.328 Of the nineteen fully adjudicated cases,
fifteen resulted in compensation for the plaintiff, while the court
ruled for the defendant in four cases.329 Many plaintiffs are young
and college-educated, and the lawsuit involves their first job.330
It is important to note that, to date, no plaintiff has filed a
lawsuit under the EPL for discrimination due to gender, disability,
ethnicity, or rural status. In addition, the foregoing analysis is
limited to lawsuits that appeared in the Chinese media and a small
number of verdicts that the author obtained through contacting
human rights lawyers in China. Because it is difficult to evaluate a
judge’s reasoning based on a small sample of media reports, the
analysis is necessarily limited. Still, basic similarities across many
cases offer the contours of the typical case.
HBV lawsuits follow a pattern, roughly analogous to Zhang
Xianzhu’s.331 Plaintiff passes the written and oral examinations of
his prospective employer, who then makes a job offer, possibly
conditioned on a medical examination. When the applicant’s medical
examination reveals that he carries HBV, the employer either rejects

326.
See infra Appendix.
327.
I have discovered one case brought to a labor arbitration committee, but
that seems to be the exception. Zhongguo Yiyu Zhenghuanzhe Fanqishi Diyian de Qishi
[Notice of China’s First Case of Antidiscrimination by Depressive], XINHUA, Aug. 4,
2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/focus/2008-08/04/content_8768175.htm.
328.
The three other cases involved depression, color-blindness, and a genetic
blood disorder called thalassemia. “Jiyin Qishi Diyian” Kaiting, Lianxi 1000 Man
Guangdongren [Hearing for “First Case of Genetic Discrimination,” Affects 10 Million
Guangdongers], YANGCHENG WANBAO [YANGCHENG EVENINGS NEWS], Feb. 3, 2010,
http://news.ycwb.com/2010-02/03/content_2421762.htm; Zhongguo Semang Jiuye Qishi
Diyian Bei Juluzhe Suopei Wuwan Fuweijin [First Case of Employment Discrimination
Against the Color-Blind in China: Refused Applicant Seeks 50,000 in Damages],
NANJING MUNICIPAL LEADING GROUP, May 21, 2009, http://www.yfzs.gov.cn/gb/info/
alxc/ldaj/2009-02/27/1414169613.html; “Zhongguo Yiyuzheng Huanzhe Fanqishi
Diyian” de Qishi [Notice on the “First Antidiscrimination Case from a Chinese Person
Living with Depression”], XINHUA, Aug. 4, 2008, http://www.bj.xinhuanet.com/bjpdjdwt/2008-08/04/content_14018937_1.htm.
329.
See infra Appendix.
330.
See, e.g., infra Appendix case 3 (Li Fei v. Wei Yi Da), case 23 (Du Lan v.
Changsha Health Department), case 18 (Gong Ping v. Unnamed Defendant). Cases
where the plaintiff is a college graduate are marked with a “cg” in the Appendix.
331.
See, e.g., Guangdong Huizhou Yigan Huanzhe Bei Citui Zhuanggao Qiye
Suopei Qimanyuan [Guangdong Huizhou: Hepatitis B Sufferer Is Fired and Receives
70,000 Yuan in Compensation from the Company], GUANGZHOU RIBAO [GUANGZHOU
DAILY], Aug. 27, 2008; Yigan Qishi Jujue Luren: Danwei Bei Pan Daoqian Jia Peichang
[Refusing Applicant Due to Hepatitis B Discrimination: Unit Ordered to Apologize and
Compensate], XINHUA, May 23, 2008, available at http://www.bj.xinhuanet.com/bjpd_
sdzx/2008-05/23/content_13349024.htm.
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the application or rescinds the offer. After an attempt at mediation,
the applicant sues in court (avoiding the sidestep of labor
arbitration332) for economic damages, emotional distress damages, or
breach of contract. He or she may also request an apology.
Chinese courts have some discretion in deciding whether to
accept cases. Some courts refuse to accept cases of discrimination in
hiring because it is not listed in the Supreme People’s Court’s causes
of action.333 Nevertheless, many judges have accepted these cases,
interpreting the disputes as implicating the right to health or the
right to privacy.334 The first hurdle for many plaintiffs, then, is to
find a judge or court willing to hear the case.
Judges also enjoy discretion in assessing damages from
emotional distress.335 Based on the limited number of verdicts
analyzed for this Article, emotional distress seems to be the main
damage for which judges order compensation.336 Two cases bear this
out. In the first case, the plaintiff passed the defendant employer’s
oral and written examinations during his final year of college, in
December 2006.337 He then signed an employment agreement (jiuye
xieyi) and stopped his job search in reliance on that agreement.338
However, in June 2007, the employer informed the plaintiff that he

332.
Labor arbitration is undesirable from a plaintiff’s perspective because it
tends to favor employers, often because local governments support employers that
provide jobs and tax revenues for local coffers. See Aaron Halegua, Getting Paid:
Processing the Labor Disputes of China’s Migrant Workers, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
254, 265 (2008) (discussing the labor bureau bias in favor of employers).
333.
Interview with Liu Minghui, Professor, China Women’s College (Nov. 26,
2008). The Supreme People’s Court Regulation on Civil Causes of Action does not
specifically list discrimination as a cause of action. See Minshi Anjian Anyou Guiding
[Regulations on Civil Causes of Action] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 4,
2008, effective Apr. 1, 2008) (failing to include employment discrimination among the
causes of action listed).
334.
Minshi Anjian Anyou Guiding [Regulations on Civil Causes of Action]
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 4, 2008, effective Apr. 1, 2008) arts. 1, 6,
163–66 (covering personality rights, the right to privacy, and various labor rights).
335.
See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Queding Minshi Qinquan Jingshen
Sunhai Peichangren Ruogan Wentide Jieshi [Supreme People’s Court Interpretation of
Several Issues in Determining the Duty to Compensate for the Tort of Emotional
Distress] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 8, 2001, effective Mar. 10, 2001) art.
10 (permitting judges to consider the extent of a tortfeasor’s culpability; specific
circumstances of the methods, situation, or conduct involved; consequences wrought by
the tort; economic capacities of a tortfeasor; and the average living standards of the
area where the case is heard).
336.
Finding verdicts from Chinese civil litigation is difficult. The existing
databases have few cases, unlike LEXIS and Westlaw in the United States. After
several requests from Chinese lawyers and NGOs, the author was able to obtain a
small sample of five such decisions, two of which are analyzed herein.
337.
Plaintiff v. Guangxi Jingui Pulp Co. Ltd., Civ. Dec. No. 312, at 1 (Qinnan
Dist. People’s Ct., Apr. 29, 2008) (on file with author), aff’d, Civ. Dec. No. 253 (Qinzhou
Interm. People’s Ct., Oct. 23 2008). To protect the identity of the plaintiff, the name has
been omitted.
338.
Id.
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would need to complete a liver examination, which revealed he
carried HBV.339 The employer then refused to hire him because he
carried HBV.340 Indeed, during a conversation that plaintiff actually
taped and produced as evidence, a member of the company’s human
resources department explicitly stated that the plaintiff was not hired
because of the result of his HBV test.341
The plaintiff sued for breach of contract, but he also sued in tort,
alleging that the company’s refusal to hire him violated his right to
equal employment and caused emotional distress.342 The court
agreed with both theories but interpreted his suit as a tort claim.343
It ordered the defendant to pay 10,000 rmb (of the 50,000 rmb
requested by the plaintiff) in compensation for emotional distress; the
court cited, among other things, the “the economic capacity of the
defendant, and the lost work time of the Plaintiff.”344 An appellate
court upheld this ruling after the defendant appealed.345
In a second case, brought against the Dazhong News Group in
Shandong, the plaintiff passed the written and oral examinations, as
well as a second-round test.346 The defendant then sent an e-mail
with a job offer, but the job offer was conditioned on passing a
medical examination.347 The examination results revealed that the
plaintiff carried HBV, but her liver functioned normally.348 The
defendant still refused to sign a contract.349 The plaintiff sued for the
breach of her right to equal employment, and she appended claims for
emotional distress and economic damages, as well as an apology.350
The court found that the defendant’s rejection “caused Plaintiff
enormous psychological pressure and emotional pain. In light of such
factors as the extent of Defendant’s culpability, the consequences
wrought by the tort, and the economic capacity for which the
tortfeasor is responsible, this court comprehensively recognizes
Plaintiff’s demand for compensation for emotional distress.”351 It
awarded her 15,000 of the 50,000 rmb that she sought in emotional

339.
Id.
340.
Id.
341.
Id. at 2.
342.
Id.
343.
Id. at 3.
344.
Id. at 4–5. The fact that lost work time was included suggests that this was
not simply a decision based on emotional distress, but rather on the economic losses
stemming from not having a job.
345.
Plaintiff v. Guangxi Jingui Pulp Industrial Co. Ltd., Civ. Dec. No. 253, at 4
(Qinzhou Interm. People’s Ct., Oct. 23, 2008).
346.
Plaintiff v. Dazhong News Group, Civ. Dec. No. 3972, at 4 (Lixia Dist.
People’s Ct., Jan. 23, 2009) (on file with author).
347.
Id. at 1.
348.
Id. at 2.
349.
Id. at 4.
350.
Id. at 3.
351.
Id. at 7.
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distress damages.352 She also requested half a year’s wages, or
12,894 rmb, in economic damages to make up for the time lost
between the defendant’s refusal to hire her and her filing of the
lawsuit.353 The court awarded a fraction of the damages sought—
1,000 rmb—in light of her “work and life circumstances.”354 Finally,
the court ordered the defendant to issue a public apology, to be
authorized by the court, within thirty days of the issuance of the
judgment.355
The above cases suggest the broad contours of HBV litigation.
The key to success in these lawsuits—as in discrimination cases in
the United States—is the adduction of proof. Unlike American
litigants, Chinese plaintiffs cannot shift the burden of proof to
defendants in discrimination cases; they must produce all the
necessary documentation themselves.356 Luckily for carriers of HBV,
there is often a long paper trail, something comparatively rare in
other discrimination cases. These documents provide the evidentiary
basis that judges need to determine that the defendant
discriminated.357 Plaintiffs may produce notices from the employer
that they passed the written and oral examinations, copies of job
offers (or conditional job offers), and other indicia that they qualified
for the position. They may also have a copy of the employer’s request
to sit for a medical examination, as well as the results of that exam.
Finally, a written rejection, conversation, or phone call (sometimes
recorded) encapsulates the rejection. From all of this evidence, judges
have a solid foundation upon which to make a finding of
discrimination.
However, a long paper trail will not arise under most other kinds
of discrimination. In gender discrimination cases, women can be

352.
Id.
353.
Id.
354.
Id. Though not a large amount, economic damages augmented her recovery
and enlarged the cognizable scope of damages for employment discrimination. From
the opinion, it is not clear what plaintiff’s life and work conditions were.
355.
Id.
356.
China does permit the reversal of burden of proof, but only in limited
circumstances such as products liability or medical malpractice. Zuigao Renmin
Fayuan Guanyu Minshi Susong Zhengjude Ruogan Guiding [Several Rules of the
Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil Procedures] (promulgated Dec. 21, 2001,
effective Apr. 1, 2002) art. 4(6), (8), translated in CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW & COURT
RULES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 243, 245 (Wei Luo trans., 1997). In all
other suits, the plaintiff is responsible for producing the relevant evidentiary
materials. Id. art. 1. As of October 2010, there is no law, regulation, or interpretation
that permits a plaintiff in an employment discrimination lawsuit to reverse the burden
of proof. Id.
357.
In many verdicts, judges write at length about the quality and reliability of
the evidence presented. See, e.g., infra Appendix (Plaintiff v. Dushi Zhongsheng
Adver.). The court spends most of the ten-page opinion analyzing the credibility of both
parties’ evidence. Plaintiff v. Dushi Zhongsheng Adver., at 2–3 (Jianghan Dist. People’s
Ct. Dec. 18, 2008) (on file with author) (categorizing the evidence into four kinds); id. at
4–9 (evaluating the evidence).
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screened out much earlier in the process. A résumé may reveal the
applicant’s gender, either because of her given name or the
photograph that often accompanies the application packet. If there is
still doubt, a phone call can ferret out female applicants, and even if a
phone call fails, the employer can simply interview the female
candidate and turn her down without generating any indicia of
discrimination. With the exception of explicit job advertisements,358
none of the discriminatory techniques discussed in this Article would
produce documentation, and this lack of documentation leaves a
judge to rule primarily on the plaintiff’s allegations, suspicions, and
interpretations. Even if the defendant made a plainly discriminatory
statement during the interview, or injected discrimination obliquely
by asking about boyfriends and children, the case would still hinge on
hearsay: her word against his. This presents a dilemma for the
presiding judge.
Therefore, it is not entirely surprising that no Chinese woman, to
this author’s knowledge, has filed a lawsuit based on gender
discrimination in hiring.359 This absence can be explained in various
ways, including the lack of evidence noted above. Some women
simply accept the prevalence of sex discrimination and adopt an
attitude of anger, resignation, and silence, the latter perceived as the
most effective of the “reasonable alternatives.”360 Others are too
concerned with finding a job; they lack the time and resources needed
to prosecute a lawsuit.361 As one interviewee put it, “Even if I won
the case, what kind of result would I get? Is the employer going to
hire me? If a company didn’t want to hire you, but you get the job
[after litigation], they are not going to make it easy for you.”362
Particularly in light of the success of various hepatitis B cases, the

358.
To my knowledge, no woman has sued for the explicit gender divisions in
any newspaper or Internet advertisement.
359.
Women have sued for various aspects of employment discrimination,
including sexual harassment, termination due to pregnancy, early retirement, and
termination after one’s husband is terminated. But these cases all involve conduct after
plaintiff has been hired. See generally FUNÜ QUANYI YU GONGYI SUSONG [WOMEN’S
RIGHTS & PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION] (Guo Jianmei & Li Ying eds., 2008) (describing
over a dozen lawsuits brought by the Center for Women’s Law & Legal Services of
Peking University, the leading women’s rights NGO in China); see also Zao Jiuye
Qishi, Weihe Weijian Nüxing Suzhe Falü [After Encountering Discrimination, Why
Have We Not Seen Women Appeal to the Law?], XINJINGBAO [NEW CAPITAL NEWS], June
15, 2009, http://www.chinanews.com.cn/edu/edu‐jysp/news/2009/06‐15/1734017.shtml
(noting that, as of June 15, 2009, not a single case of gender discrimination in hiring
had been filed). Also note that recent searches on Google and Baidu revealed no
discrimination cases brought by women (last checked Apr. 19, 2011).
360.
See Zhao Li, Huiwang Jiuye Cujin Fa Shishi Yinian: Weijuli Jiujing You
Duo Qiang [Reflecting on One Year of Implementation of the Employment Promotion
Law: How Strong Is the Deterrence?], FAZHIWANG [RULE OF LAW WEBSITE] (Mar. 11,
2009), http://www.procedurallaw.cn/fzrd/200903/t20090311_191813.html.
361.
Id.
362.
Id.
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absence of sex discrimination lawsuits calls into question the efficacy
of the EPL as a tool to combat employment discrimination.
C. Problems
For all of its important advances, the Employment Promotion
Law omits a few basic necessities. These gaps could be filled through
subsequent legislation, provincial legislation, implementing
guidelines, administrative regulations, or judicial interpretations.
This section offers some suggestions to heighten the efficacy of
China’s antidiscrimination laws generally and the EPL in particular.
First, the EPL does not define discrimination. This may seem
like a formality, but the concept of discrimination is not widely known
in China, including among judges.363 Consequently, formalities like a
clear definition of discrimination can make a big difference to the
presiding judge.
Second, the EPL does not cover a wide range of discrimination
that is quite common in contemporary China. Marital status,
appearance, and height are routine bases for refusing to hire
someone,364 even though they have almost no bearing on the ability to
perform. To be sure, it is unreasonable to expect antidiscrimination
law to respond perfectly to contemporary conditions ab initio,
particularly given the slow and gradual development of Chinese legal
reform, which prefers minor and incremental change to cataclysm.
Moreover, as experience in other countries shows, protected classes
tend to proliferate over time; in a few years, it is likely that a new
group, currently unrecognized, may clamor for their rights more
loudly or persuasively.365 For example, during the drafting of the
EPL, a number of public commentators pointed out the prevalence of
age discrimination.366 The decision not to include age discrimination
may be tied to the prevalence of the differential retirement age for
men and women, which has been a heated source of debate in recent
years.367

363.
Interview with Li Cheng, antidiscrimination lawyer and doctoral candidate,
Shanghai Jiaotong University (Mar. 15, 2009).
364.
See Zhu Zhe, Bias Is a ‘Way of Life in Jobs,’ CHINA DAILY, Jan. 8, 2007,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-01/08/content_776547.htm.
365.
The United States first protected race, sex, color, religion, and national
origin in the 1964 Civil Rights Act; age in the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment
Act; and disability in the 1990 Americans with Disability Act. See Federal Laws
Prohibiting Discrimination: Questions and Answers, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N
(Nov.
29,
2009),
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html
(outlining
antidiscrimination laws).
366.
See PROMOTION LAW INTERPRETATION, supra note 31, at 65.
367.
See, e.g., Chen Zhili Urges Gender Equality in Retirement Age, NAT’L
PEOPLE’S CONG. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Apr. 6, 2009),
http://www.npc.Gov.cn/englishnpc/news/Events/2009-04/06/content_1496720.htm
(noting that Ms. Chen, a senior legislator in the NPC Standing Committee, expressed
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Third, the protections offered are not as robust as they could be.
As already discussed, discriminatory job advertisements are common,
and interviewers routinely ask women personal questions about
marriage and childbirth plans.368 Indeed, some employers still
require women to forego pregnancy for many years as a condition of
employment.369 A legal prohibition on gender restrictions in print
and online advertisements would be a good first step, followed by the
proscription of personal questions in interviews.
Fourth, the law does not address the evidentiary issues that
typically emerge in employment discrimination lawsuits. In the
United States, plaintiffs frequently struggle to adduce evidence of
discrimination, which is almost exclusively within the defendant’s
possession.370 The Supreme Court responded to this lacuna with the
McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting mechanism: after the plaintiff
makes a prima facie showing of employment discrimination, the
burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory
reason for its decision; if the defendant meets that burden, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove why the defendant’s
proffered reason is pretextual.371 To be sure, burden-shifting has
attracted its own set of critics,372 but it has leveled the evidentiary
playing field between defendants, who are loath to turn over
information behind their employment decisions, and plaintiffs, who
must rely on stray comments or other circumstantial evidence to
prove their case.

support for Beijing to change the law on retirement ages, calling the current system “a
terrible waste of human resources, particularly for those who have doctorates or
master’s degrees”); Nüganbu Wantui Tiaokuan Bei Cechu [Provision on Later
Retirement for Female Candidates Removed], BEIJING NEWS, May 5, 2005,
http://news.cctv.com/society/20090505/107566.shtml
(noting
that
the
Beijing
government decided to withdraw the issue of changing the age from further
discussion).
368.
See supra Part II.C.
369.
de Silva de Alwis, supra note 137, at 233.
370.
See LEWIS, & NORMAN, supra note 35, at 167–68 (“Unsurprisingly, outside
the realm of policies that discriminate by their clear terms on the basis of a protected
characteristic, cases presenting smoking-gun exemplars of ‘direct,’ ‘express,’ or ‘facial’
evidence are relative rarities.”).
371.
McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973).
372.
See generally Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Employment Discrimination:
Moving Beyond McDonnell-Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in
Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK L. REV. 659 (1998) (attacking the McDonnell-Douglas
burden shifting framework). The authors suggest that burden-shifting distracts judges
from focusing on the “ultimate question,” namely, whether it is more likely than not
that the employer engaged in discrimination. Id. at 678. They propose instead that
judges at the summary judgment stage first weigh plaintiff’s evidence, second weigh
defendant’s evidence that it did not discriminate, and third view the evidence
holistically, drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Id. at 674–78. If the
evidence passes these three stages, the case is ready for a jury trial. Id. at 677–78.
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Fifth, the law does not address the question of legal liability, and
remedies in particular, with sufficient specificity.373 Suppose that the
plaintiff proves that her job application was turned down for a
discriminatory reason. What should her redress be? Does she get the
job? Does she get the next available job? Should she receive another
form of injunctive relief? And what remedial or punitive measures
should courts levy against discriminating employers? Some scholars
have suggested that employers should have to either withdraw
discriminatory advertisements or lose the ability to advertise
altogether.374 As for punitive measures, these scholars recommend a
number of sanctions, including civil liability, to cover economic losses
and emotional distress damages to the plaintiff; administrative
liability, such as a fine from the employer to the relevant enforcement
agency; and even criminal liability.375 These alternative forms of
liability could take the form of implementing legislation from the
Ministry of Labor and Social Services or a judicial interpretation by
the Supreme People’s Court.
The EPL could have taken a page from the 2007 Labor Contract
Law, Section VII of which lays out various situations that a judge
may face in presiding over a case.376 Because of Section VII, a judge
knows what to do if, for example, an employer fails to set out
mandatory clauses in the labor contract,377 retains the employee’s ID
card or seizes his property,378 or does not certify the termination of a
labor contract.379 The EPL does not reach this level of specificity. As

373.
Zhou Huyong, Jiuye Qishi Susong Jiuji Tixi de Goujian [Components of a
Redress System for Employment Discrimination Litigation], 23 BEIJINGSHI GONGHUI
GANBU XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. OF BEIJING FED’N OF TRADE UNIONS CADRE C.] 42, 42
(2008).
374.
Zhang Huagui & Guo Yiyi, Lun Jiuye Xingbie Qishide Falü Guizhi:
Jianping “Jiuye Cujin Fa” zhi Xiangguan Guiding [On Legal Regulations of Sex
Discrimination in Employment: A Critique of the Relevant Provisions in the
“Employment Promotion Law”], 167 FAZHI YU JINGJI [L. & ECON.] 33, 34 (2008). The
authors suggest that discriminating employers should bear both remedial
(buchangxing) responsibility and punitive (zhengfaxing) responsibility. Id. at 34. The
former would permit the appropriate government agency to make employers withdraw
discriminatory requirements, such as “men only” or “men preferred.” The latter could
consist of civil, administrative, or criminal punishments to be used when the remedial
responsibility could not make a plaintiff whole. Id.
375.
Id. Criminal liability, which would require revision of the criminal code, is
unlikely, though countries like France have criminalized some forms of racial
discrimination. See generally Julie C. Suk, Equal by Comparison: Unsettling
Assumptions About Discrimination Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 302–03, 309–11 (2006)
(describing French criminal sanctions for discrimination and the history of sanctions on
discriminatory speech in particular).
376.
See Laodong Hetong Fa [Labor Contract Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008), ch. VII
(detailing the situations in which an employer is liable).
377.
Id. art. 81.
378.
Id. art. 84.
379.
Id. art. 89.
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a result, additional regulations by other government organs are
needed.
Sixth, a problem as widespread as employment discrimination
requires the coordinated efforts of courts, labor bureaus, local people’s
congresses, and other official actors.
The EPL tasks certain
government organs with eliminating discrimination, but only in
vague terms. For instance, Article 25 provides that “People’s
Governments at every level shall create a fair employment
environment, eliminate discrimination in employment, formulate
policies and take measures to support and assist the hard-toemploy.”380 But local governments are busy entities, more likely
concerned with creating jobs than assisting those who have been
refused. Given their mandate to increase GDP and economic growth,
local governments may hesitate to formulate such a policy,
particularly if it might antagonize employers who practice
employment discrimination.
Similarly, Article 60 provides that “Labor administration
authorities shall supervise and inspect the implementation of this
Law, establish a reporting system, accept reports of violations of this
Law and promptly verify and handle the same.”381 This provision is
more specific, but the author is not aware of a single labor bureau
that has set up a reporting system. Such a body is certainly
necessary, however; like the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission in the United States, it could handle cases, monitor job
advertisements, and investigate employers against whom charges
have been directed. As it stands now, many forms of employment
discrimination go unpunished, while job advertisements help to
segregate workspaces based on age, gender, and physical appearance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Employment discrimination is now firmly imprinted in the
national psyche of the PRC. Famous cases have captured headlines
and public attention. NGOs dedicated to various causes have been
formed, raising awareness, suing offenders, conducting research, and
even training employers about the problems of discrimination. A
consensus is forming that discrimination—though widespread—is
wrong. By passing the Employment Protection Law in 2007, the
national government took its largest step toward ensuring equal
employment. Plaintiffs have won a handful of well-publicized cases,
suggesting that courts view the law favorably, and the media has the
government’s blessing to report on employment discrimination.

380.
Jiuye Cujin Fa [Employment Promotion Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) art. 25.
381.
Id. art. 60.
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Moreover, the long-discussed implementation deficit of Chinese law is
shrinking, if only slightly.
If the Chinese government continues to advance these reforms, it
will first have to revise a thicket of discriminatory legislation. Most
likely, this revision process will be piecemeal, reflecting recent
gradualist trends, as well as the general nature of Chinese legal
reform. Or it could be achieved through an all-encompassing law,
such as a new antidiscrimination law. Regardless, the government
will have to chart new ground, resolving the evidentiary issues that
the Employment Promotion Law does not address, reviewing the
publication of discriminatory advertisements, explaining what kinds
of remedies are available to successful plaintiffs, and perhaps even
establishing a body to monitor employment discrimination. This
short history of employment discrimination in China shows that
proscription is always a work in progress. China has taken the first
steps down the righteous path of prohibiting discrimination.
Presumably, popular support for these initiatives will continue.
Finally, this Article demonstrates that Chinese citizens, with the
assistance of civil society groups and online technologies, can
effectuate legal change in a gradual, small-scale way. It remains to
be seen how well this lesson can be applied to other areas of potential
legal reform, but the EPL proves that the energies and activism of a
small, committed group of people can change the law, even in
democratically challenged contemporary China.
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APPENDIX – HBV Litigation (unless otherwise noted)

1

Verdict
10/4/07

Plaintiff’s
status
CHEN Long

2

10/14/07

LI Sheng

3

1/4/08

4

#

Defendant
Chang Shuo
Tech Co.
Nokia

Dist. Ct., Place
Nanhui, Shanghai

LI Fei, cg

Dongguan Wei Yi
Da

Dongguan, GD

3/25/08

ZHANG Lihong

Chaoyang, BJ

5

5/24/08

GAO Jun

Beijing Duoqi Qiye
Consulting Co.
Bide Telecom Co.

6

7/19/08

YUAN Ye, cg

Jabil Elec.

Unknown

7

8/5/08

YUAN
Yipeng
(depression)

IBM Shanghai

Pudong LAC, SH

8

8/27/08

WANG An

Hongku Elec.

Huizhou, GD

9

10/25/08

XU Jianguo, cg

Guangxi Jingui
Pulp Ltd.

Qinnan, Qinzhou

10

11/3/08

A Gang

Unnamed Co.

Nanning

11

12/9/08

WANG
cg

Mai Ke Wei Er Air
Con

Longgang,
Shenzhen

12

12/10/08

TAO Ming

Nanchang, Jiangxi

13

12/18/08

LIANG Qi, 25

14

1/23/09

ZHANG Yun, 21

15

2/27/09

ZENG Lei 25 cg
(colorblind)

16

5/4/09

LI Wen, 23, cg

17

5/29/09

18

6/15/09

WANG Zhuo, 24,
MS
GONG Ping, cg

Jiangxi Province
Chil’s Hosp.
Dushi Zhongsheng
Adver.
Dazhong Daily
News
Henan Province
Rural Credit
Union
Unnamed Tech.
Co.
Unnamed Eng.
SOE
Unnamed Cable
Co.

19

7/9/09

YU Lihua, cg

Shenzhen
Development Bank

Luohu, Shenzhen

20

10/9/09

GUO Lin, 25, cg

21

1/8/10

XIAO Qi

Jianggan,
Hangzhou
Yunyan, Guiyang

22

1/14/10

TANG,
ZHOU

Fushikang Group
Elec.
Provincial
Testing Ctr.
Foshan Dep’t of
H.R.

23

1/25/10

DU Lan

Yuelu, Changsha

24

3/5/10

CHEN Ling

Changsha
Ministry Health
Dechang Elec.

25

3/11/10

WANG Li

Taipingyang Prop.
Ins.

Tianhe, Guangzhou

Xiaoguo,

XIE,

Dongguan, GD

Chaoyang, BJ

Wuhan, Hubei
Lixia, Jinan
Jinshui, Zhengzhou
Luogang
Guangzhou
Chengguan,
Lanzhou
Urumqi, Xinjiang

Chancheng, Foshan

Baoan, Shenzhen

Remedy:
unknown
D voluntarily
offered 5k
P could not
verify voice
24k ec; D
promised not to
discriminate
Sought 50k
17k ec, 2k emo,
apology
Undisclosed
settlement
Reinstated
labor K, 57k in
lost wages
5k emo,
apology
1st: 10k emo,

2nd: 10k emo
Sought 30k in
ec
Sought 65k in
ec & emo,
apology
Annulled D’s
rejection
5k emo,
apology
15K emo, 1k ec,
apology
Sought 3k
ec,50k emo,
apology, job
20k settlement
15k settlement
1st: 0, 2nd: 18k
settlement
3k ec, 325 for
tests, 30 for
transport costs
5k settlement
privacyy viol
1st: 0, 2nd: 0
1st: 0, 2nd:
ongoing
1st: 0
1st: 0, 2nd: 3k
in emo
8k emo
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*Prevailing party in bold (plaintiff in bold if the case settled because
he or she received compensation)
**Abbreviations: cg: college graduate; ec: economic damages; emo:
emotional distress damages; apology: court ordered defendant to
publish written apology
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